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Foreword
Today the environment has been mainstreamed into the multilateral trading system,
and has significant implications for shaping future rules under the WTO regime.  A critical
negotiation issue in the Doha Ministerial Declaration is the relationship between existing WTO
rules and specific trade obligations pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements.
This  study  examines  each  of  the  questions  that  have  arisen  with  regard  to
understanding the relationship between specific trade  obligations  under  certain  multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) and WTO environmental provisions in the negotiations
under paragraph 31(i) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration: When are restrictive trade measures
on environmental grounds justifiable under the GATT Article XX exceptions?  In particular,
how has the GATT Article XX been interpreted in environmental trade disputes? What is a
MEA, and what is the status of specific trade obligations under certain MEAs vis-a-vis WTO
trade rules?  What is the current state of the negotiations in the Committee on Trade and
Environment  Special  Sessions  on  this  issue?    What  is  India’s  current  position  and  an
appropriate future strategy?
The paper analyzes how environmental provisions have permeated into the multilateral
trading  system  over  the  last  two  decades,  through  the  incorporation  of  environmental
provisions under new WTO agreements, and a wider interpretation of the GATT Article XX
exceptions in the post-WTO regime through trade-environment disputes.
The analysis considers six MEAs in detail:  the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered  Species  of  Wild  Flora  and  Fauna;  the  Montreal  Protocol  on  Substances  that
Deplete the Ozone Layer; the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal; the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; the Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides  in  International  Trade;  and  the  Stockholm  Convention  on  Persistent  Organic
Pollutants.    The  paper  examines  the  trade  provisions  within  the  six  MEAs  and  their
compatibility with existing GATT/WTO rules.
The paper then takes up the work under the Committee of Trade and Environment on
the relationship between MEAs and WTO rules; the current state of the negotiations under
Paragraph 31 (i) Doha Ministerial Declaration; and the position taken by India at the WTO.
Finally, the study suggests a way forward for India in the negotiations on the relationship
between MEAs and WTO rules in light of the current developments, so that her trade interests
are not hurt.
The study should contribute to a deeper understanding of the issues involved in the
WTO debate on the subject, among policy makers, researchers and members of the business
community in India.
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I  Introduction
Environmental issues began to be systematically addressed in the WTO following
the Decision on Trade and Environment taken towards the end of the Uruguay Round at
Marrakesh in 1994.  The Committee on Trade and Environment was established in the
same year, with the explicit mandate to resolve environmental issues in the trading system.
Some new agreements under the WTO also contained environmental provisions.  In 2001
the  environment  was  explicitly  put  on  the  negotiating  agenda  in  the  Doha  Ministerial
Declaration in 2001.  Today the environment has been mainstreamed into the multilateral
trading system, and has significant implications for shaping future rules under the WTO
regime.
Indeed,  environment  is  a  horizontal  issue  cutting  across  sectors  and  disciplines
within  the  multilateral  trading  system  of  the  WTO.    In  keeping  with  the  principle  of
supporting sustainable development along with free trade, as set out in the Preamble of the
WTO, the environment is significant in the WTO negotiation agenda of goods as well as
services.
I.1  Trade and Environment
The trade and environment interface has typically been analyzed in the literature in
two  parts:  first,  the  effect  of  trade  policy  on  environment;  and  second  the  effect  of
environmental policy on trade.  Under the first, the pertinent question has been whether
trade liberalization leads to environmental degradation; and under the second, the pertinent
question  has  been  whether  more  stringent  environmental  policy  has  a  detrimental
(reducing) effect on trade.2
The  effect  of  trade  liberalization  on  the  environment  is  subdivided  into  three
categories (i) product effect, (ii) structural effect, and (iii) scale effect.
1  (i) The product
effect of trade is positive when trade liberalization expands the market for goods produced
in an environmentally sound manner and/or environmental services like resource saving
technology.  Negative product effect results when goods directly harmful to the ecosystem
are exchanged internationally.  (ii) The structural effect of trade is the trade-induced change
in the industrial composition and consumption, and depends on the pollution intensity of
national output. The effect on the environment is positive if expanding export sectors are
less polluting on average than contracting import-competing sectors; and negative if the
opposite holds.  (iii) The scale effect of trade results from enhanced economic activity,
including higher levels of production, resource extraction, and transportation. The impact
on the environment is typically negative due to the greater pollution generated.
In particular, the scale effect is accompanied by an increase in total production and
income, and the latter can have a positive impact on the environment through the increased
demand  for  better  environmental  quality  (acting  directly  through  market,  as  well  as
through enhanced demand for environmental regulations from the voting population).  The
net environmental effect of trade liberalization is the sum of the product, structural, scale
and income effects, and can be either positive or negative depending on the magnitudes of
the component effects.
Apart from the environmental effects mentioned above, trade liberalization can also
have regulatory effect, where existing environmental policies of a liberalizing economy are
changed to facilitate trade.  The regulatory effect of trade is likely to be positive since
greater  trade  is  associated  with  stronger  domestic  environmental  policies  (say
harmonization of environmental standards, or increased enforcement of existing norms).
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1  For details see Stevens (1993) and Grossman and Krueger (1991).3
The adverse environmental effect of trade noted under structural effect can take
place only in the presence of market failures and regulatory failure.  In the presence of an
existing market failure, the environmental costs of production and consumption are not
adequately  reflected  in  the  market  prices,  thus  free  trade  can  accentuate  the  adverse
environmental  effect  (incorrect  resource  utilization  of  an  economy)  by  expanding
production in these sectors.  Alternatively, regulatory failure can also be the source of the
problem, when government policies aimed to encourage certain economic activities have
adverse environmental impact, as in the case of subsidies for water or chemical inputs in
agriculture that can lead to excessive extraction of ground water or overuse of chemical
pesticides resulting in drop in the water table and chemical runoff.
Thus the root cause of environmental degradation following trade liberalization is
not trade per se, but the underlying market or regulatory failures.  A WTO Secretariat
Report on Trade and Environment (WTO 1999) recognized the theoretical and empirical
literature that trade is rarely the root cause of environmental degradation (except under the
scale  effect)  and  that  most  environmental  problems  result  from  polluting  production
processes, certain kinds of consumption, and the disposal of waste products.  The WTO
report observed that trade would unambiguously raise welfare if proper environmental
policies were in place.  An expansion of trade can conceivably produce large negative
environmental effects to outweigh the conventional benefits from liberalization only if a
country lacks domestic environmental policy that reflects its environmental values (GATT
1992: 2).  Indeed, a lack of appropriate environmental policies creates problems not just in
the trade sector, but through every facet of a country’s economic life (ibid: 3).
The second aspect of the trade-environment interface, namely the trade effect of
environmental  policy,  raises  the  question  of  competitiveness  in  international  trade  and
whether divergent environmental policies across nations lead to the emergence of pollution
havens  in  developing  countries  (which  are  typically  lagging  behind  in  environmental
regulation  compared  to  the  developed  countries).    The  empirical  literature  on
competitiveness  indicates  that  the  cost  implications  of  more  stringent  environmental
regulations are minor.  Since pollution abatement costs of industries in OECD countries4
are only a few percentage points of the total production costs, it is unlikely that relatively
lower environmental standards would be the moving force for migrating industries (Jaffe et
al 1995).  A study of US trade by sectors noted that, overall abatement costs being small, it
did  not  have  any  significant  impact  over  time  on  the  revealed  comparative  advantage
(Ferrantino 1997).  In particular, the pollution abatement costs in the US increased from
0.3%  of  output  value  in  1970s  to  0.8%  in  1992  for  manufactures  (only  the  capital
expenditure for abatement was significant and equal to 10% of total capital costs). On the
whole,  the  composition  of  foreign  investments  received  by  developing  countries  (net
recipients of foreign direct investment) is not biased towards polluting industries but rather
to labour-intensive industries that are less polluting on average.
Thus  the  harmonization  of  environmental  standards  across  countries  for  local
pollutants is not supported on economic grounds, since the competitive effects are minor.
Even on ecological grounds, it is not efficient to harmonize environmental standards across
countries for local pollution problems, since the resource endowment, buffering capacity of
the local ecosystem and preferences are likely to be different across countries.
Harmonization of environmental standards is only relevant for transboundary or
global pollution problems, and it has been widely recognized that international cooperation
and good governance at the international level are necessary to protect global commons.
This  is  the  basis  for  establishing  multilateral  environmental  agreements  (MEAs)  –  to
promote cooperation and shared responsibility to protect the global commons.
The first report of the Committee on Trade and Environment recognized that trade
measures based on specifically agreed-upon provisions may be needed in certain cases to
achieve  the  environmental  objectives  of  an  MEA,  particularly  where  trade  is  related
directly to the source of an environmental problem (emphasis added, WTO 1996: 37).
Today, the WTO has become the focal point for resolving the trade-environment interface,
especially  with  regard  to  trade  provisions  within  MEAs,  perhaps  because  it  has  “an
integrated adjudication mechanism backed by trade sanctions as the ultimate enforcement
tool”  (WTO  1999).    The  cooperative  model  of  the  WTO,  based  on  legal  rights  and5
obligations,  seems  to  offer  a  potential  model  for  a  new  global  architecture  of
environmental cooperation.  In 1999 a WTO Secretariat report noted that “the issue is how
to  reinvent  environmental  polices  in  an  ever  more  integrated  world  economy  so  as  to
ensure that we live within ecological limits. The way forward, it would seem to us, is to
strengthen the mechanisms and institutions for multilateral environmental cooperation, just
like  countries  50  years  ago  decided  that  it  was  to  their  benefit  to  cooperate  on  trade
matters.”
I.2  MEAs and Trade Measures
There  are  about  three  hundred  international  environmental  agreements  existing
today (considering amendments as separate agreements, since all Parties to the original
agreement sometimes are not Party to subsequent amendments),
2 and about thirty among
these  contain  trade  measures.    Recently  the  WTO  Secretariat  noted  that  there  are  238
international environmental agreements under the UNEP, with 28 of them containing a
trade measure or provision that can impact trade (WTO 2003: 127).
3  However, not all of
the international environmental agreements are multilateral in the true sense of the term
(i.e. with a worldwide participation), since several environmental initiatives are regional in
nature.
4
Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have evolved over the years as a
cooperative means of protecting and conserving environmental resources or controlling for
pollution that are transboundary or global in nature. The Agenda 21, adopted in 1992,
noted that since MEAs are based on international consensus, they provide the best way of
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coordinating  policy  action  to  tackle  global  and  transboundary  environmental  problems
cooperatively.
The MEAs have independent governing systems, and typically have organizational
aspects  including:  (i)  enabling  their  members  to  prepare,  evaluate  and  make  policy
decisions; (ii) providing some kind of review of implementation, including monitoring and
settlement of disputes; and (iii) providing support for implementation, including capacity
building and resource transfer (Oberthur 2002: 12).
Trade measures have been incorporated in  MEAs  where  uncontrolled  trade  can
potentially  lead  to  environmental  damage  (say,  loss  of  biological  diversity  for  species
threatened  with  extinction  as  in  the  Convention  on  International  Trade  in  Endangered
Species),  or  even  as  a  means  of  enforcing  the  agreement  and  prevent  free-riding  by
banning trade with non-parties (as in the Montreal Protocol).
The  trade  measures  in  MEAs  include  a  wide  range  of  measures  including
monitoring  of  through  export-import  permits  and  consents;  identification  label
requirements; and export-import bans in specific products and states.  While some of the
trade  measures  are  outlined  within  the  agreements  as  specific  obligations,  other  trade
measures may be neither specific nor mandatory. It is pertinent to note that, in 1992 the
GATT Secretariat had observed “as long as participation in a MEA is not universal, trade
provisions will be, like negative trade incentive, discriminatory” (GATT 1992: 31).
The  current  WTO  negotiations  on  the  relationship  between  trade  obligations
pursuant to MEAs and the multilateral trade rules have been driven by concerns of the
Members about the WTO consistency of certain trade measures applied pursuant to some
MEAs, especially those which are discriminatory trade restrictions.
In the clarification of the relationship between MEAs and WTO rules, two aspects
are important to note:  First, trade provisions in MEAs are typically in the form of import
or export bans, which are in principle GATT/WTO incompatible.  Trade bans are allowed7
in the GATT only under the general exception clause of Article XX (paragraphs b, d, and
g).  Second, trade provisions in some MEAs discriminate between Parties and non-Parties,
and the implementation of those provisions could result in an inconsistency with the GATT
principle of unconditional Most Favoured Nation Treatment (GATT Article I) in case all
WTO Members are not Parties to an MEA.  Till date, there has been no formal dispute
under the WTO that could settle the question of whether and under what circumstances
trade measures in MEAs are consistent with WTO rules.  Thus the relationship between
MEAs and WTO rules remains an untested legal question (Pearson 2000: 297).
I.3  The WTO Negotiation Agenda on the Environment
The environmental agenda of the WTO was initiated with the work programme of
the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), established under the Decision on Trade
and Environment in 1994 at the end of the Uruguay Round.  The environment explicitly
featured in the negotiation agenda for the first time in the Doha Ministerial Declaration
(DMD) in 2001.  The inclusion of the environment in the WTO negotiation agenda was
pushed  by  primarily  the  European  Union,  and  supported  by  Switzerland,  Norway  and
Japan.
The current negotiation agenda on environment as outlined in the DMD draws on
some of the items of the CTE that have been under discussion since 1995.    At Doha, the
Members agreed that in “enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment”
negotiations would cover:
(i)  The relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations (STOs)
set out in the multilateral environmental agreements.  The negotiations shall be
limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to
the MEA in question.  The negotiations will not prejudice the WTO rights of any
Member that is not a Party to the MEA in question.
(ii)  Procedures for regular information exchange between MEA secretariats and the
relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observer status.8
(Paragraph 31 i and ii, DMD)
5   
The  Doha  Ministerial  Declaration  also  clarified  that  the  negotiations  on  the
relationship between STOs contained in MEAs and WTO rules is to be “compatible with
the open and non-discriminatory nature of the multilateral trading system”, and should “not
add  to  or  diminish  the  rights  and  obligations  of  Members  under  WTO  agreements,  in
particular the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” nor
“alter the balance of the rights and obligations” (emphasis added, DMD Paragraph 32).
While the negotiation agenda in paragraph 31 of the Doha mandate is limited to
only MEAs with specific trade obligations, the final clarification of the relationship will
have significant impact on the interpretations of the GATT Article XX exceptions (for the
protection  of  human,  animal  and  plant  health;  and  conservation  of  exhaustible  natural
resources); and of the term “sustainable development” in the Preamble establishing the
WTO.    In  other  words,  the  clarification  of  the  relationship  between  multilateral
environmental agreements and the multilateral trading rules is closely linked to the larger
question of when and which restrictive trade measures may be considered to be WTO
consistent on environmental grounds.
The unresolved issue regarding the relationship between trade measures in MEAs
and WTO rules has also spilled over into the discussions among parties of some of the
concerned  MEAs.    For  instance,  in  the  fourteenth  meeting  of  parties  of  the  Montreal
Protocol  in  December  2002,  a  decision  was  adopted  to  “monitor  developments  in  the
negotiations of the World Trade Organization Committee on Trade and Environment in
special session and report to the Parties” (Decision XIV/11).  The Ozone secretariat was
also requested to report to the Parties of the Protocol on meetings attended at the WTO,
and any substantive contacts with the WTO Secretariat and its Committee Secretariats.
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tariffs  and  non-tariff  barriers  to  environmental  goods  and  services  (para  31  iii,  DMD).    The  WTO
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I.4  Objective and Outline of the Study
This study addresses the questions that have arisen with regard to the understanding
the  relationship  between  specific  trade  obligations  under  certain  MEAs  and  WTO
environmental provisions in the negotiations under paragraph 31(i) of the DMD.  To begin
with, when are restrictive trade measures on environmental grounds justifiable under the
GATT  Article  XX  exceptions?    In  particular,  how  has  the  GATT  Article  XX  been
interpreted in environmental trade disputes? What is an MEA, and what is the status of
STOs under certain MEAs vis-a-vis WTO trade rules?  What is the current state of the
negotiations in the CTESS (Committee on Trade and Environment Special Sessions) on
this issue?  What is India’s current position and an appropriate future strategy?
Section 2 briefly analyzes how environmental provisions have permeated into the
multilateral  trading  system  over  the  last  two  decades,  through  the  incorporation  of
environmental provisions under new WTO agreements (like the Agreements on Technical
Barriers to Trade; and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures), and a wider interpretation of
the GATT Article XX exceptions in the post-WTO regime.  Section 3 studies the trade
provisions in selected MEAs and the associated environmental provisions in the WTO.
The analysis considers six MEAs:  the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna; the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone  Layer;  the  Basel  Convention  on  the  Control  of  Transboundary  Movement  of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal; the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; the Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals
and Pesticides in International Trade; and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants.  Section 4 discusses the work under the CTE on the relationship between MEAs
and WTO rules, as well as the current state of the negotiations under Paragraph 31 (i)
DMD.  Section 5 reviews the current position taken by India at the WTO discussions and
the way forward.  Section 6 concludes.10
II  Environment issues in the GATT and WTO
II.1  GATT and the Group on EMIT
6
The  only  reference  to  environmental  conservation  in  GATT  1947  was  in
paragraphs (b) and (g) of Article XX (General Exceptions), where departure from free
trade could be made by a country provided the trade restriction was applied in an non-
discriminatory manner against a product harmful to health (human, animal or plant) or
exhaustible  natural  resources.    The  issue  of  the  environment  began  to  be  discussed
systematically in the multilateral trading system much later in 1971.  It was initiated in the
run up to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm,
when  the  GATT  Secretariat  was  asked  to  make  a  contribution.  Consequently,  the
Secretariat prepared a study entitled “Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade”,
which  examined  the  implications  of  environmental  protection  policies  on  international
trade.  The study indicated how environmental policies could become obstacles to trade as
well as constitute a new form of protectionism namely, green protectionism.  During the
decades of seventies and eighties, the international focus remained on economic growth,
social  development  and  environment,  being  largely  influenced  by  the  1972  Stockholm
Conference.
A  Group  on  Environmental  Measures  and  International  Trade  (EMIT)  was
established in November 1971, based on suggestions by some of the GATT parties.  The
participation in EMIT was open to all GATT Members, and the group was to convene at
the request of GATT Members. Yet no such meeting was called until twenty years later in
1991 in order to contribute to another international environmental conference scheduled in
1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).
While the EMIT may have been defunct, the environment did feature in the trade
negotiations during the Tokyo Round (1973–1979), when participants took up the question
of the degree to which environmental measures (in the form of technical regulations and
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standards) could form obstacles to trade. The Standards Code or Tokyo Round Agreement
on  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  was  negotiated  to  ensure  non-discrimination  in  the
preparation,  adoption  and  application  of  technical  regulations  and  standards,  and
transparency of such technical barriers.
The Standards Code, adopted in 1979, sought to encourage the development of
international standards and eliminate the trade barrier effects of technical regulations and
standards (including packaging, marking and labelling requirements), in order to improve
efficiency in the trade of industrial and agricultural products.  The agreement recognized
that “no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality
of  its  exports,  or  for  the  protection  of  human,  animal  or  plant  life  or  health,  of  the
environment or for the prevention of deception practices” (emphasis added) provided these
were not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory manner.  While the GATT
did not contain any reference to the environment explicitly (except for natural resources,
human, animal and plant health in Article XX b and g), the Standards Code (a plurilateral
agreement)  clearly  allowed  a  window  for  environmental  protection  through  product
specifications in case the traded product posed a threat to the environment.  The WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (a multilateral agreement) that came into effect
in  1995  largely  drew  from  the  Standards  Code,  and  further  clarified  the  provision  for
environmental justification (see section 2.2).
While the Standards Code encouraged harmonization of technical specifications to
international  standards,  it  allowed  parties  to  adopt  their  own  technical  regulations  and
standards/ certification systems, subject to a transparent notification procedure, whenever a
relevant international standard did not exist.  However, parties could skip these procedural
details in adopting their own regulations/ standards (Article 2.6) and certification systems
(Article 7.4) in case of “urgent problems of safety, health, environmental protection or
national security” (emphasis added).
It should be noted here that the Standards Code covered technical regulations and
standards pertaining to the product and not processes or production methods.  Parties were12
encouraged  to  specify  regulations  and  standards  in  terms  of  “performance  rather  than
design or descriptive characteristics” (Article 2.4).  Moreover, Annex I, defined the term
technical  specification  to  be  characteristics  of  a  product  such  as  levels  of  quality,
performance, safety or dimensions.”
7
In the following decade, at the 1982 GATT ministerial meeting, the Members took
up the issue of export of domestically prohibited products, following the concern of several
developing countries that products prohibited in developed countries on the grounds of
environmental  hazards,  health  or  safety  reasons,  continued  to  be  exported  to  them.
Subsequently,  a  Working  Group  on  the  Export  of  Domestically  Prohibited  Goods  and
Other Hazardous Substances was established in 1989.  Meanwhile, in 1987 a report from
the  World  Commission  on  Environment  and  Development  Our  Common  Future
introduced  the  term  “sustainable  development”,  and  recognized  that  international  trade
could  help  in  the  process  of  development  to  alleviate  poverty  and  environmental
degradation.
8  This concept over time gained significance as a founding principle of the
WTO.
While the Uruguay Round (1986-94) was still in progress, a major environmental
conference  took  place:  the  1992  UNCED  at  Rio  de  Janeiro.    In  the  1990  Ministerial
meeting at Brussels, the countries from the European Free Trade Area proposed that a
formal  statement  on  trade  and  environment  be  made  by  the  Ministers,  with  priority
attention to interlinkages between environmental policy and multilateral trading system.
This  was  followed  by  a  request  from  the  EFTA  countries  (with  support  from  other
delegations) to re-convene the EMIT Group, and to prepare a GATT contribution for the
forthcoming UNCED.  The contracting parties agreed that the EMIT would be convened
and examine three issues including: (i) trade provisions contained in existing multilateral
environmental agreements vis a vis the GATT principles and provisions; (ii) multilateral
                                                
7  A  technical  regulation  was  defined  as  a  mandatory  technical  specification,  including  the  applicable
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to Trade in the 1979 Standards Code).
8  Better known as the Brundtland Report.13
transparency of national environmental likely to have trade effects; and (iii) trade effects of
new packaging and labeling requirements to protect the environment.  The Group on EMIT
reactivated and met during November 1991 to January 1994.
The discussions on trade and environment initiated by the EMIT was taken up more
formally  in  1994  by  the  Sub-Committee  on  Trade  and  Environment  of  the  WTO
Preparatory  Committee.  The  GATT  study  on  Trade  and  Environment  (GATT  1992)
identified 17 MEAs containing trade measures, and the WTO Sub-Committee on Trade
and  Environment  identified  another  such  MEA  in  force  by  1994  (WTO  1994).    In
particular, the issues of trade measures applied unilaterally by a WTO Member to address
environmental problems lying outside its national jurisdiction, and trade measures pursuant
to MEAs became items in the work agenda of the CTE.  One of the important questions to
be resolved was how trade measures pursuant to MEAs could affect WTO Member’s rights
and obligations.
It is worthwhile to note  that  in  preparing  for  the  Rio  summit,  the  participating
countries, in particular developing countries recognized that international trade could help
alleviate poverty, which in turn would help improve the environment.  At the UNCED,
nations adopted Agenda 21: the action programme to promote sustainable development.
The  concept  of  sustainable  development  established  a  link  between  environmental
protection and economic development at large. Thus environment issues were linked to
trade in the new constitution of the multilateral trading system signed in 1994, and the term
sustainable development was explicitly incorporated in the preamble establishing the new
World Trade Organization.
II.2  WTO, Environmental Provisions and the CTE
Towards the end of  the  Uruguay  Round,  the  issue  of  the  environment  featured
prominently in the multilateral discussions with respect to the role that WTO in trade-
related environmental issues.  The Decision on Trade and Environment, signed by the trade
ministers at Marrakesh in April 1994, laid the foundation of continuing work undertaken in
the WTO, and mainstreaming environment into the multilateral trading system.  Moreover,14
the first paragraph of the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO
recognized sustainable development as an integral part of the multilateral trading system,
and  the  importance  of  environmental  protection.    The  Preamble  observed  that  in  the
endeavour to promote trade,  raise standards of  living  and  ensure  full  employment,  the
WTO  Members  recognize  that  the  optimal  use  of  the  world  resources  would  be  “in
accordance with the objective  of  sustainable  development,  seeking  both  to  protect  and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent
with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.”
Environmental provisions were included within some of the new agreements under
the WTO, including: the  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); the Agreement
on  the  Application  of  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Measures  (SPS);  the  Agreement  on
Agriculture (exemption from reduction commitments for payments in agricultural sector
under environmental programmes, Annex 2, para 12); and the Agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual  Property  Rights  (ineligibility  of  certain  inventions  for  patenting  to  protect
human, plant or animal life or health, to avoid serious harm to the environment, Article
27.2 and 27.3).  The TBT and SPS, which accommodated the calls for harmonization and
level-playing field in product and process specifications, contained provisions for the use
of standards to protect health and the environment.
II.2.1  The Agreements on TBT and SPS
While the 1979 Standards Code covered technical aspects of both non-food and
food tradable products, under the WTO two separate agreements, namely the TBT and SPS
Agreements, now covered the non-food and food items respectively.
The  TBT  categorized  product  technical  requirements  under  regulations  and
standards:    The  compliance  with  regulations  being  mandatory,  but  that  with  standards
being  voluntary.    The  TBT  largely  drew  from  the  1979  Standards  Code,  but  further
clarified the basis of using technical regulations to ensure that unnecessary obstacles to
trade are not created while protecting the environment:  “technical regulations shall not be
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the15
risks  non-fulfilment  would  create.  Such  legitimate  objectives  are,  inter  alia:    national
security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or
safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment” (Article 2.2).  The assessments of
such  risks  are  to  be  based  on  “available  scientific  and  technical  information,  related
processing technology or intended end-uses of products”.  Moreover, in case Members
used technical regulations “for one of the legitimate objectives explicitly mentioned in
paragraph 2, …in accordance with relevant international standards, it shall be rebuttably
presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade” (emphasis added,
Article 2.5).
Another significant change in the TBT, as compared to the Standards Code, was the
expansion  in  the  definition  of  technical  regulation  to  include  more  than  just  product
characteristics. While Members were to adopt regulations in terms of performance rather
than design or descriptive characteristics (Article 2.8 of TBT, comparable to Article 2.4 of
Standards Code), the definition in the annex was different. Technical regulations now were
defined  as  “product  characteristics  or  their  related  processes  and  production  methods,
including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory…
also  include  or  deal  exclusively  with  terminology,  symbols,  packaging,  marking  or
labelling  requirements  as  they  apply  to  a  product,  process  or  production  method”
(emphasis added, Annex I, TBT).
Similarly,  the  SPS  Agreement  covered  the  quality/safety  specifications  of  food
products,  including  the  process  and  production  methods  of  food.  The  SPS  agreement
elaborated “rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the
use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b)”
including the chapeau of the Article XX (SPS Agreement, paragraph 8).  The agreement
defined  sanitary  or  phytosanitary  measures  to  “include  all  relevant  laws,  decrees,
regulations,  requirements  and  procedures  including,  inter  alia,  end  product  criteria;
processes  and  production  methods;  testing,  inspection,  certification  and  approval
procedures;  quarantine  treatments  including  relevant  requirements  associated  with  the
transport of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during16
transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of
risk assessment;  and packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety”
(Annex I, SPS).
The SPS measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, have
to be based on scientific principles and cannot be maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence (Article 2.2), nor “be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade” (Article 2.3).
9  Moreover, according to the agreement,
the  SPS  measures  have  to  be  harmonized  with  international  standards  (Article  3),  in
particular with those in the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of
Epizootics,  and  the  international  and  regional  organizations  operating  within  the
framework  of  the  International  Plant  Protection  Convention.    Members,  however,  are
allowed to introduce or maintain sanitary/ phytosanitary measures which result in a higher
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on
the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific
justification, or if it is determined to be appropriate (by the Member) in accordance with
the relevant provisions of risk assessment contained in Article 5 (Article 3.3).    
When introducing SPS measures, Members should make risk assessments, using
risk assessment techniques developed by relevant international organizations (Article 5.1),
with the available scientific evidence (Article 5.2).
10  Moreover, Article 5.6 requires that
members ensure that the measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
their  appropriate  level  of  sanitary  or  phytosanitary  protection,  taking  into  account
technical and economic feasibility.
11  In case relevant scientific evidence is insufficient,
Article 5.7 allows a Member to provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on
                                                
9  The Article 2 of the SPS Agreement covers the rights and obligations of the WTO members.
10  The risk assessment exercise required taking into account the relevant ecological and environmental
conditions,  besides  the  available  scientific  evidence;  relevant  processes  and  production  methods;
relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of
pest- or disease-free areas and quarantine or other treatment (Article 5.2).
11  Article 5.5 states that members shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers
to  be  appropriate  in  different  situations,  if  such  distinctions  result  in  discrimination  or  a  disguised
restriction on international trade.17
the basis of available pertinent information.  Since such measures can be adopted only on a
provisional basis, Members are required to “seek to obtain the additional information and
review” the measure accordingly within a “reasonable period of time”.
Thus both the TBT and SPS Agreements have a common objective, namely that of
harmonization  and  transparency  of  standards,  in  order  to  eliminate  unnecessary  trade-
restricting measures.  At the same time, however, the Agreements allow departures from
international standards.  The SPS Agreement allows departure from international standards
on the basis of a scientific justification, or as a result of risk assessment when a Member
chooses to adopt higher standard.  Similarly, under the TBT Agreement when a Member
adopts  technical  regulations  with  the  legitimate  objective  of  protecting  health  or  the
environment, a risk assessment is required to compare between fulfillment versus non-
fulfilment of the objective.
II.2.2  The CTE
While the WTO Agreements contained provisions on the environment and health,
the Decision on Trade and Environment laid the foundation of continuing work on the
trade-environment interface under a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).  The
principle  of  the  Decision  was  that  “there  should  not  be,  nor  need  be,  any  policy
contradiction  between  upholding  and  safeguarding  an  open,  non-discriminatory  and
equitable multilateral trading system on the one hand, and acting for the protection of the
environment,  and  the  promotion  of  sustainable  development  on  the  other”.  Thus  the
foundation of the WTO was based firmly on the principle that free and fair trade would be
promoted  along  with  sustainable  development  and  environmental  protection  –  and  by
extension would not go against efforts to protect the environment, such as a multilateral
environmental agreement.
The work of the CTE was to ensure that the rules of multilateral trade support
environmental  and  sustainable  development.  While  upholding  the  GATT/WTO  basic
principles of national treatment and non-discrimination, the CTE was mandated to take on
the unresolved issues from the Uruguay Round.  Two of the ten items in the CTE’s agenda18
related  to  MEAs  have  been  typically  considered  in  conjunction:
12  (Item  i)  -  The
relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade measures
for  environmental  purposes,  including  those  pursuant  to  multilateral  environmental
agreements.  (Item v) - The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the
multilateral trading system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements.
The issues for the CTE pertaining to the first item on relationship between MEAs
and WTO included: (a) ensuring the compatibility of trade measures taken pursuant to
MEAs and the WTO, and (b) the adequacy of WTO transparency mechanisms concerning
trade measures included in relevant MEAs.  For the fifth item, the issues included (a)
environmental  expertise  in  trade  dispute  settlement,  and  (b)  trade  expertise  in
environmental  dispute  settlement  (WTO  1995).    The  CTE’s  work  on  the  first  item
examined whether there was a need to clarify the scope under the GATT/WTO provisions
to accommodate trade measures pursuant to MEAs.  Several Members made proposals (see
section 4.1 later) in this regard, and many felt that the existing WTO provisions allowed
for trade measures within MEAs to be applied in a consistent manner.
In 1996, the CTE endorsed multilateral solutions based on international cooperation
and consensus as the best and most effective way for governments to tackle environmental
problems of a transboundary or global nature.  It acknowledged that WTO Agreements and
MEAs are representative of efforts of the international community to pursue shared goals,
                                                
12  Other  items  include:  (ii)  The  relationship  between  environmental  policies  relevant  to  trade  and
environmental  measures  with  significant  trade  effects  and  the  provisions  of  the  multilateral  trading
system. (iii) A. The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and charges
and taxes for environmental purposes. B. The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral
trading system and requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards
and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling. (iv) The provisions of the  multilateral
trading system with respect to the transparency of trade measures used for environmental purposes and
environmental  measures  and  requirements  which  have  significant  trade  effects.  (vi)  The  effect  of
environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to developing countries, in particular to
the  least  developed  among  them,  and  environmental  benefits  of  removing  trade  restrictions  and
distortions. (vii) The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods. (viii) The relevant provisions of
the Agreement on Trade-Related  Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. (ix) The  work programme
envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment. (x) Input to the relevant bodies in
respect  of  appropriate  arrangements  for  relations  with  intergovernmental  and  non-governmental
organizations referred to in Article V of the WTO.19
and in the development of a mutually supportive relationship between them due respect
must be afforded to both.
In particular, the CTE recognized that a range of provisions in the WTO could
accommodate  the  use  of  trade-related  measures  needed  for  environmental  purposes,
including measures taken pursuant to MEAs.  The CTE noted  that  trade  measures  are
within the scope provided by the relevant criteria of the general exception provisions of
GATT  Article  XX,  and  this  accommodation  within  the  multilateral  trading  system  is
valuable and it is important that it be preserved by all (WTO 1996: 38).
II.3  Interpretation of the GATT Article XX in Environmental Trade Disputes
The  GATT  Article  XX  general  exceptions  to  free  trade  contain  the  first
environmental provisions of the multilateral trading system.  The exceptions contained in
paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the article have been invoked in trade disputes related to the
protection of the health and environment.  The Article XX states that so long as trade
measures applied are not arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory between countries or a
“disguised restriction on international trade”, Members can adopt measures
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
(d) necessary  to  secure  compliance  with  laws  or  regulations  which  are  not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption
In the pre-WTO regime, six trade disputes involved environmental/ health-related
measures under GATT Article XX exceptions.  These disputes and the corresponding year
of panel report adoption, include:  (i) US –  Prohibition  of  Imports  of  Tuna  and  Tuna
Products from Canada (1982), (ii) Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon (1988), (iii) Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal20
Taxes on Cigarettes (1990), (iv) US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from Mexico also
referred to as Tuna I (1991, but not adopted)
13, (v) US –Restrictions on Imports of Tuna
from EEC also referred to as Tuna II (1994, but not adopted); and (vi) US –Taxes on
Automobiles (1994, not adopted).
Under the WTO, rulings have been made on three environmental trade disputes
under GATT Article XX (food safety disputes being now covered separately under the SPS
Agreement). The three environmental disputes and the corresponding year of adoption of
panel/  Appellate  Body  reports  by  the  Dispute  Settlement  Board  include:    (i)  US  –
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline also referred to as Reformulated
Gasoline (1996); (ii) US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
(1998) also referred to as Shrimp-Turtle; and (iii) EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (2001).
A  comparison  of  the  environmental  trade  disputes  in  the  pre-  and  post-WTO
regimes  illustrates  a  significant  change  in  the  interpretation  of  GATT  Article  XX
provisions.  This subsection briefly discusses the two pre-WTO environmental disputes of
Tuna  I  and  Tuna  II;  and  the  two  post-WTO  environmental  disputes  of  Reformulated
Gasoline  and  Shrimp-Turtle.    All  four  of  these  disputes  concerned  trade  restrictions
invoked under GATT Article XX exceptions for the protection of environment/ exhaustible
natural resources.
II.3.1  Tuna I:
The Tuna I dispute in 1991 between the United States and Mexico, for the first time
turned  the  focus  on  the  question  of  GATT-consistency  of  Member  nations  following
sovereign environmental policies and imposing the same on a trading partner.  The US had
imposed  an  embargo  on  imports  of  yellow-fin  tuna  and  tuna  products  from  Mexico,
Venezuela and Vanuatu and from the intermediary countries of Costa Rica, France, Italy,
                                                
13  Unlike the system of decision making now contained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the
WTO, in the GATT a panel report was not adopted if there was no consensus. Under the WTO, if the
members do not by consensus reject a panel report after 60 days, it is automatically accepted or adopted.21
Japan and Panama based on its domestic regulation, the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) of 1972 as amended.  The MMPA prohibited the incidental killing or seriously
injuring  any  marine  mammal  (beyond  the  US  standard  set
14)  in  connection  with  the
harvesting of fish within the jurisdiction of the US.  Moreover, Section 101(a)(2) of the
Act provided for a ban on importation of commercial fish or products from fish caught
with commercial fishing technology which resulted in the incidental killing or incidental
serious  injury  of  ocean  mammals  in  excess  of  United  States  standards.    Thus  the  Act
effectively  set  a  ceiling  limit  on  dolphin  catches  for  American  fishing  fleet  and  for
countries exporting to the US.
Mexico complained against the US embargo on the grounds that the embargo was
inconsistent with the GATT rules, like: that the provision under MMPA was inconsistent
with  Article  III  (National  Treatment  of  traded  products),  the  embargo  was  also  not
"necessary" in the sense of Article XX, and that Article XX (b) referred to protection of the
life  and  health  of  humans  and  animals  within  the  territory  of  the  contracting  Party
protecting them.  On the other hand, the US argued that the GATT’s National Treatment
provision permitted the enforcement of dolphin protection standards set out in the MMPA,
and the import embargo was justified under Article XX exception clauses to protect animal
health or exhaustible natural resources.
The Dispute Panel noted that the US embargo was not covered under GATT Article
III, since the latter “covers only those measures that are applied to the product as such”,
and regulations on incidental killing/ injury to dolphin “could not be regarded as being
applied to tuna products as such because they would not directly regulate the sale of tuna
and could not possibly affect tuna as a product” (GATT 1991).  Under the principle of
National Treatment, the US was obliged to treat Mexican tuna no less favourably than
domestic tuna (the traded product), irrespective of the ways in which they may have been
harvested since it did not impact tuna as a product.  This implied that non-product related
                                                
14  On an average, the vessel of harvesting nations could not take (incidental killing/ injury) more than 15%
of eastern spinner dolphin and not more than 2% of coastal spotted dolphin as a proportion of the total
number of marine mammals taken by such vessels in a year.  (GATT 1994a)22
process and production methods could not used as a basis of trade measures under the
GATT.    The  Panel  ruling  found  that  the  US  embargo  was  contrary  to  Article  XI:1
(elimination of quantitative restrictions).
The  Dispute  Panel  also  ruled  the  import  prohibition  of  Mexican  tuna  as
unjustifiable under Article  XX (b) or (g);  and  the  import  prohibition  on  “intermediary
countries” unjustifiable under Article XX (b), (d) or (g). The Panel noted that while the
provisions  of  the  GATT  did  not  restrain  a  contracting  party  in  the  implementation  of
domestic  environmental  policies,  “a  contracting  party  may  not  restrict  imports  of  a
product merely because it originates in a country with environmental policies different
from its own” (emphasis added, GATT 1991). The Dispute Panel considered the Article
XX exceptions to protect exhaustible natural resources (here dolphins) to be applicable
only to natural  resources lying  within the  jurisdiction  of  the  government  imposing  the
regulations.
II.3.2  Tuna II
In 1992, the EC and Netherlands complained that the US embargo against primary
and intermediary countries, based on the MMPA, did not fall under Article III (National
Treatment), was inconsistent with Article XI:1 (Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions)
and  was  not  covered  by  the  exceptions  of  Article  XX.    The  US  argued  that  the
intermediary nation embargo was consistent with GATT, covered by Article XX (b), (d)
and  (g),  and  that  the  primary  nation  embargo  did  not  nullify  or  impair  any  benefits
accruing to the EC or the Netherlands since it did not apply to these countries.
On  the  jurisdictional  issue  of  its  action,  the  US  argued  that  provisions  under
international  environmental  agreements  allowed  for  import  restrictions  that  did  not
necessarily restrict jurisdictional applicability.  In particular, Article 3 of the Convention
Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, 1933, allowed for the
prohibition of products from intermediary countries unless otherwise certified.  The US
argued  that  while  the  Convention  applied  to  hunting  and  killing  within  the  parties'23
respective  territories,  the  restrictions  on  importation  required  application  to  activities
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the importing party, and were designed to protect
resources outside the importing party’s jurisdiction (emphasis added).  Similarly, Article IX
of  the  Convention  on  Nature  Protection  and  Wild  Life  Preservation  in  the  Western
Hemisphere  (1940)  provided  for  each  contracting  government  to  take  the  necessary
measures to control and regulate the importation, exportation and transit of protected fauna
and flora through an export certification system or the “prohibition of the importation of
any species of fauna or flora or any part thereof protected by the country of origin unless
accompanied by a certificate of lawful exportation”.  Apart from these two Conventions
the US also cited the provisions for import prohibitions under other MEAs: Article 3 of the
International Convention for the Protection of Birds (1950); Article V of the Agreement on
the Conservation of Polar Bears (1973); Article VIII:2 of the Convention on Conservation
of  North  Pacific  Fur  Seals  (1976);  Article  3  of  the  Convention  on  the  Prohibition  of
Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific (adopted 1989, but not yet in force).  Two
of these agreements, namely, the International Convention for the Protection of Birds and
the  Agreement  on  Conservation  of  Polar  Bears,  did  not  provide  any  jurisdictional
limitation on the import and export prohibitions.
In the light of Article 31 (general rule of interpretation) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, the US interpreted that there was no jurisdictional limitation on the
location of the resource or living thing in GATT Article XX (g) and (b).  The Dispute
Panel, however, pointed out that the Article 31 of the Vienna Convention refers to "any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions", while the international agreements cited in the dispute were
bilateral or plurilateral agreements that were not concluded among the contracting parties24
to the General Agreement.  Thus these agreements did not apply to the interpretation of the
General Agreement or the application of its provisions.
15
In determining the necessity of the US measure for conservation of dolphins, the
Panel concluded that measures taken to force other countries to change their policies, and
which were effective only if such changes occurred, could not be considered "necessary"
for the protection of animal life or health in the sense of Article XX (b). Thus an essential
condition  of  Article  XX  (b)  had  not  been  met.    The  Panel  found  that  the  import
prohibitions on tuna and tuna products maintained by the United States inconsistent with
Article XI:1 and not justified by Article XX (b).
The  Dispute  Panel  noted  that  the  objective  of  sustainable  development,  which
includes  the  protection  and  preservation  of  the  environment,  is  recognized  by  the
contracting parties to the General Agreement. The Panel did not question the validity of the
environmental  objectives  of  the  US  to  protect  and  conserve  dolphins,  but  examined
whether,  in  the  pursuit  of  its  environmental  objectives,  the  US  could  impose  trade
embargoes to secure changes in the policies which other contracting parties pursued within
their own jurisdiction.  The Panel ruled that the US import prohibitions (both the primary
and the intermediary nation embargo) on tuna and tuna products under the MMPA “did not
meet the requirements of the GATT Article III, were contrary to Article XI:1, and were not
covered by the exceptions in Article XX (b), (g) or (d)”.
II.3.3  Reformulated Gasoline:
In  January  1995,  Venezuela,  followed  by  Brazil,  complained  against  US
discrimination in import of gasoline under the latter’s Gasoline Rule.  The complainants
                                                
15  The Panel also observed that under the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention account
should  be  taken  of  "any  subsequent  practice  in  the  application  of  the  treaty  which  established  the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." However, the Panel noted that practice under the
bilateral and plurilateral treaties cited both the primary and intermediary nation embargoes on tuna were
taken by the United States so as to force other countries to change their policies with respect to persons
and things within their own jurisdiction, since the embargoes required such changes in order to have any
effect on the protection of the life or health of dolphins.  (GATT 1994a)25
argued that the US restriction was inconsistent with GATT Article III (National Treatment)
and not covered by GATT Article XX exceptions.  The US Gasoline Rule (based on the
1990 Amendment of the Clean Air Act)
16, effective 1995, permitted only gasoline of a
specified cleanliness (reformulated gasoline) to be sold to consumers in the most polluted
areas of the country, while in the rest of the US, gasoline no dirtier than that sold in the
base year of 1990 (conventional gasoline) could be sold.
The Dispute Panel ruled that the US Gasoline Rule was inconsistent with Article III
since imported and domestic gasoline should be considered as "like products".  Moreover,
the US action was not justified under the GATT Article XX paragraphs (b), (d) or (g). The
US appealed on the Panel’s findings on Article XX (g), and subsequently the Appellate
Body found that the baseline establishment rules (for both domestic gasoline and imported
gasoline)  in  the  Gasoline  Rule  fell  within  the  terms  of  Article  XX  (g).   However, the
Appellate Body ruled that the US application of the baseline rules constituted "unjustifiable
discrimination" and a "disguised restriction on international trade…  and not entitled to the
justifying protection afforded by Article XX as a whole” (WTO 1996b: 30).  According to
the Appellate Body, the US action failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article
XX, since the US could have used alternative means to implement its Clean Air Act by
“imposition of statutory baselines without differentiation as between domestic and imported
gasoline” (WTO 1996b: 26).
The Appellate Body used the principle of interpretation based on Article 31.1 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:  “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and  in  the  light  of  its  object  and  purpose.”  (WTO  1996b:  17-24),  and  considered  the
objective of the Gasoline Rule (namely, to implement the US 1990 Clean Air Act) and
GATT Article XX including its chapeau to interpret them.  The Appellate Body, however,
noted  “two  omissions  on  the  part  of  the  United  States:    to  explore  adequately  means,
                                                
16  The 1990 US Clean Air Act Amendment established certain compositional and performance specifications
for reformulated gasoline, in order to reduce the emissions of volatile organic compounds and toxic air
pollutants.  The Rule established baselines (1990) for domestic refiners, and related baselines for blenders
and importers of gasoline.26
including  in  particular  cooperation  with  the  governments  of  Venezuela  and  Brazil,  of
mitigating the administrative problems relied on as justification by the United States for
rejecting  individual  baselines  for  foreign  refiners;  and  to  count  the  costs  for  foreign
refiners that would result from the imposition of statutory baselines” (WTO 1996b: 30).
Hence the US action was unjustifiable under Article XX.
Thus the first environmental trade dispute brought  to  the  WTO  affirmed that  a
Member  (here  the  US)  had  the  right  to  adopt  the  stringent  environmental  standards,
provided the application of the regulation does not discriminate against foreign imports.
“WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the
environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and the
environmental legislation they enact and implement.” (emphasis added, WTO 1996b: 32).
Moreover, if the Member could demonstrate cooperation with other Members towards the
implementation of the regulation, such unilateral environmental legislation may be found
justifiability under GATT Article XX.  In its final conclusion, the Appellate Body recalled
the preamble to the WTO Agreement as well as the Decision on Trade and Environment, to
emphasize the importance of cooperation and “of coordinating policies on trade and the
environment.”
II.3.4  Shrimp-Turtle:
An amazingly similar dispute to the Tuna I case was brought to the WTO against
the US in 1996.  The US had banned shrimp imports from countries where the shrimp was
harvested without Turtle Excluder Devices (hence killing too many Olive Ridley Turtles in
the  process)  as  required  under  its  domestic  legislation,  the  1989  Public  Law  101-162,
Section 609.   Malaysia and Thailand, followed by Pakistan and then India, complained
that the import prohibition was inconsistent under Article  I:1 (Most  Favoured Nation),
Article XI:1 (Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions), and Article XIII:1 (Restrictions to
Safeguard Balance of Payments).  The US justified its measure under Article XX (b) and
(g), arguing that the provision did not constrain jurisdictional limitations nor the location
of the natural resources/ animals to be protected and conserved.27
In 1997, the Dispute Panel ruled in favour of the complainants, and found that the
import ban in shrimp and shrimp products as applied by the United States was inconsistent
with Article XI:1 of GATT 1994, and unjustifiable under Article XX of GATT.  After the
US appeal on the Panel’s interpretation, in 1998 the Appellate Body also found the US
unilateral action unjustified, but reversed the Panel' s finding that the US measure at issue
was not within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX of GATT
1994.  The Appellate Body ruled that the US measure qualified for provisional justification
under Article XX (g), but it failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX
since the measure was discriminatory, and therefore not justified under Article XX.
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The Appellate Body also clarified the meaning of exhaustible natural resources in
Article XX to include renewable living resources, and indicated that the complainants had
misinterpreted the term: “Textually, Article XX (g) is not limited to the conservation of
‘mineral’ or ‘non-living’ natural resources. The complainants’ principal argument is rooted
in  the  notion  that  ‘living’  natural  resources  are  ‘renewable’  and  therefore  cannot  be
exhaustible natural resources. We do not believe that ‘exhaustible’ natural resources and
‘renewable’ natural resources are mutually exclusive. One lesson that modern biological
sciences teach us is that living species, though in principle, capable of reproduction and, in
that  sense  ‘renewable’,  are  in  certain  circumstances  indeed  susceptible  of  depletion,
exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human activities.” (WTO 1998: paragraph
128).
Moreover, the Appellate Body reiterated the Preamble of the WTO Agreement,
which  states  that  the  optimal  use  of  natural  resources  should  be  in  accordance  with
sustainable development.  The Appellate Body indicated that the language of the Preamble
allowed for a wider interpretation of the WTO provisions and agreements, based on the
“intentions” of the WTO negotiators to acknowledge the environmental dimensions into
the multilateral trading system:
                                                
17  Report of the Appellate Body, “US- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products” (AB-
1998-4), WT/DS58/AB/R, dated 12 October 1998: pages 75-76.28
“(the) language demonstrates a recognition by WTO negotiators that optimal use
of  the  world's  resources  should  be  made  in  accordance  with  the  objective  of
sustainable development.  As this preambular language reflects the intentions of
negotiators of the  WTO Agreement, we believe  it  must  add  colour,  texture  and
shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in
this case, the GATT 1994.  We have already observed that Article XX(g) of the
GATT 1994  is  appropriately  read  with  the  perspective  embodied  in  the  ..
preamble.” (WTO 1998, paragraph 153)
The  Appellate  Body  Report  noted  the  intent  of  the  international  community  to
protect environmental resources and made several references to international conventions.
More significantly, the Appellate Body observed that the WTO agreements should not be
viewed in “clinical isolation” from other rules of international law, including treaties.
18  In
particular, the Olive Ridley sea turtle was listed under species threatened with extinction in
Appendix 1 of the CITES, and also as a migratory species in Annex I of the Convention on
the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.  The references were made to
illustrate that the sea turtle should be considered as “exhaustible natural resources”, as well
as  the  international  community’s  efforts  to  conserve  this  resource.    In  this  dispute,
however,  the  traded  product  was  shrimp  (not  an  endangered  species)  and  not  the
endangered turtles, thus the CITES (ratified by both India and the US) did not apply.
The  final  ruling  by  the  Appellate  Body  upheld  the  principle  of  cooperation  to
protect global environmental resources as contained in the MEAs like the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals; as well as the Rio principle of the avoidance of protectionist trade measures, and
the  adherence  to  effective  multilateral  disciplines  to  ensure  responsiveness  of  the
multilateral trading system to environmental objectives (WTO 1998, paragraph 154).   The
Appellate Body also recalled Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding,
under which the WTO agreements are to be interpreted in accordance with “customary
rules of interpretation of public international law”.  Since MEAs are international treaties,
                                                
18  This approach was evident in the ruling of the US –Gasoline (1996) dispute too.  As will be seen later in
Section 4, this has been quoted by the EC in its submission on current negotiations on trade measures
pursuant to MEAs to highlight the true interpretation of WTO rules.29
they form part of the international law, and bear on the settlement of environmental trade
disputes under the WTO.
The  environmental  provision  under  the  GATT/WTO  were  interpreted  with
reference  to  “sustainable  development”  in  the  Preamble  and  in  a  wider  context  of  the
“intentions of negotiators of the WTO Agreement” (ibid, para 153).  The US unilateral ban
on shrimp was found unjustifiable for much the same reason as in the Gasoline dispute –
lack of cooperative efforts before resorting to trade measures to protect the environment.
In this case, the US had failed to engage in any concerted bilateral or multilateral effort to
conserve the sea turtles:
“Another  aspect  of  the  application  of  Section 609  that  bears  heavily  in  any
appraisal of justifiable or unjustifiable discrimination is the failure of the United
States to engage the appellees, as well as other Members exporting shrimp to the
United  States,  in  serious,  across-the-board  negotiations  with  the  objective  of
concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation
of sea turtles, before enforcing the import prohibition against the shrimp exports of
those other Members”
(WTO 1998: paragraph 166)
This  suggested  that  in  case  the  US  engaged  in  bilateral  or  multilateral
environmental  agreements  to  protect  the  sea  turtle  in  question,  the  unilateral  measure
would be justified.
Not  surprisingly,  in  the  2001  dispute  on  the  Compliance  panel  report,  after
Malaysia took recourse to Article 21.5 (Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Dispute) of the DSU and appealed on the grounds of dissatisfaction with
US action, the US was found to be justified in its action.   By this time, the US had
demonstrated  good  faith  efforts  by  negotiating  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  with
certain countries in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia region (the South-East Asian
MOU) that took effect on 1 September 2001”
 (WTO 2001: 50).   The 2001 ruling clearly
established  that  a  WTO  Member  with  demonstrable  cooperative  efforts  to  protect  the
environment with its trade partners is justified in unilateral trade restrictions under GATT30
Article XX.  Thus Barfield (2001) observed that the Shrimp-Turtle dispute set forth an
“evolutionary interpretation of unilateralism”.
II.4  WTO Jurisprudence in Environmental Trade Disputes
The GATT Article XX exceptions on environmental grounds have so far provided
ample room for departures from free trade, and its interpretation over the last decade has
expanded considerably (comparing the Tuna I analysis with that of the Shrimp Turtle).
Several changes are significant.
First, in the pre-WTO regime, process and production methods unrelated to the
product (e.g. incidental kill of dolphin during tuna harvest) was a matter of consideration,
however, in the post-WTO Shrimp-Turtle dispute, the distinction between product- related
or non-product-related production process was of no consequence.  This probably reflected
the cognizance of the total environmental impact of a product from cradle to grave – i.e.
the aggregate environmental resource cost, irrespective of the fact whether it affects the
final product characteristics or not.
Second, and more importantly, the extra-jurisdictional aspect of a Member country
imposing domestic environmental regulation on its trading partner did not arise in the post-
WTO  environmental  disputes.  In  the  Tuna  I  case,  the  Dispute  Panel  had  categorically
noted that a contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it
originates in a country with environmental policies different from its own, and Article XX
exceptions were interpreted to apply only to environmental resources within the Member
country’s jurisdiction.  In the Appellate Body rulings of the Gasoline and Shrimp-Turtle
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disputes, however, the extra-jurisdictional aspect of similar unilateral action was not an
issue,  and  the  focus  was  on  the  depletable/  exhaustible  nature  of  the  environmental
resources in question, namely, air and turtles respectively.  While this new jurisprudence is
                                                
19  In the Shrimp-Turtle dispute, the Appellate Body noted that: “We do not pass upon the question of
whether there is an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of
that limitation.  We note only that in the specific circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient
nexus between the migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the United States for
purposes of Article XX(g).” (WTO 1998: paragraph 133).31
appropriate  from  the  ecological  perspective,  there  is  a  risk  of  the  same  logic  being
extended to differential environmental regulations for local pollutants in future disputes,
since Members have autonomy to a large degree in determining their own environmental
policies.
Both  in  the  Gasoline  and  the  Shrimp-Turtle  disputes,  the  issue  of  extra-
jurisdictional imposition of environmental standards/ regulations was disregarded, and the
focus  was  turned  on  whether  the  US  had  engaged  in  any  cooperative  efforts  before
resorting to the unilateral trade sanction.  In the Gasoline case, the Appellate Body also
noted that the cost of compliance with the American standards by foreign countries had
been neglected.  Thus both rulings provided a clear avenue for justifiable unilateral trade
sanctions  in  case  the  US  could  demonstrate  its  good  faith  efforts  in  environmental
protection cooperatively with the trading Member prior to the unilateral action.  Since the
2001 Shrimp-Turtle Compliance dispute was ruled in favour of the US in recognition of
such good faith effort, it is likely that a trade restriction pursuant to a MEA is likely to
survive a potential WTO-challenge.  After all an MEA is a good faith multilateral effort,
and multilateral actions are generally preferred to unilateral action under the WTO system
(Brack and Gray 2003: 26).
Third,  in  the  post-WTO  disputes,  the  environmental  provisions  under  the
GATT/WTO system have been “interpreted in good faith” and “in the light of its object and
purpose” (Article 31.1, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).  In future the GATT
Article XX exceptions will continue to be interpreted in the wider context since “context for
the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including
its preamble and annexes… . any agreement … or instrument” among the parties (Article
31.2, Vienna Convention), and not in the narrow context used in the Tuna I dispute.  The
Appellate Body analysis of the recent disputes recognized the “intentions of negotiators of
the WTO Agreement”, and gave due regard to the international community’s efforts to
conserve  the  environment,  including  MEAs.    This  suggests  that  even  if  no  new
environmental  provisions  are  negotiated  under  the  WTO,  the  existing  commitment  to
support “sustainable development” and “protect and preserve the environment”, as stated32
in  the  Preamble,  is  sufficient  for  the  multilateral  trading  system  to  acknowledge  and
support contemporary environmental initiatives of the international community.
This  argument  could  be  even  extended  to  suggest  that  the  WTO  would
acknowledge and support new MEAs even if not all of its Members are party to the new
treaty.  While a new treaty cannot create rights and obligations for a third party without its
consent (Article 34, Vienna Convention), there is provision for rules in a treaty to become
binding  on  a  third  party  through  international  custom  (  “as  a  customary  rule  of
international law, recognized as such”) under Article 38 of the Vienna Convention.
Finally,  the  jurisprudence  in  the  interpretation  of  GATT  Article  XX  in  the
environmental  trade  disputes  under  the  WTO  is  significant  since  it  comes  under  the
category  of  “subsequent  practice  in  the  application  of  the  treaty  which  establishes  the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” (Article 31.3 b, Vienna Convention),
and has in effect established the meaning of exceptions under Article XX (b), (d), and (g).
It is interesting to note that the two major WTO Members, namely the US and the
EC, support and approve of the current jurisprudence of the WTO.  In particular, the US
has been and continues to be a proponent of a robust dispute settlement system in the
WTO.  Indeed the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement system, considered to be
“one of the most significant changes adopted as a part of the Uruguay Round” was sought
by the US Congress in the negotiations since it considered the GATT dispute settlement to
be “ineffective”.
20  In 2002, the US Secretary of Commerce noted that an “effective dispute
settlement system advantages the United States not only through the ability to secure the
benefits negotiated under the agreements, but also by encouraging the rule of law among
nations”.
21  The US had anticipated in its negotiations that the application of the DSU
                                                
20  US  Secretary  of  Commerce  (2002).    “The  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  Understanding  achieved  the
objectives set out by the Congress by effecting important changes in the GATT 1947 dispute settlement
process,  including  time  limits  for  each  stage  of  the  dispute  settlement  process;  appellate  review;
automatic adoption of panel or Appellate Body reports in the absence of a consensus to reject the report;
and procedures to suspend trade concessions with any Member failing to implement Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) recommendations and rulings.”
21  Emphasis added, ibid.33
would “improve its ability to contest foreign trade remedy actions against U.S. exporters”.
The US Secretary of Commerce’s assessment of the WTO dispute settlement system is
that, overall the system has worked to the benefit of the U.S., providing a means to enforce
U.S. rights and contributing to greater compliance by WTO Members.  The United States
has been able to successfully use (in several disputes where the US was the complainant)
the WTO dispute settlement “to open markets for U.S. business; to preserve and create
U.S.  jobs;  to  eliminate  trade  distorting  practices  from  the  global  marketplace;  and  to
defend successfully U.S. laws and policies.”
Given these benefits accrued through the WTO dispute settlement system, the US
will continue to support and actively use the system to enforce its domestic environmental
standards unilaterally through the multilateral trading system, rather than be party to a
multilateral environmental initiative.  Indeed, whenever, domestic commercial interests are
threatened, the US has refrained from being a party to a MEA.  For instance, the US is not
a party to the Basel Convention, nor the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, since it is one of
the  largest  exporters  of  hazardous  wastes  (covered  under  the  Basel)  and  genetically
modified products (covered under the Cartagena Protocol).
At the same time, the EC has been encouraged by the new jurisprudence in the
environmental trade disputes under the WTO, since the approach adopted in resolving such
cases “strongly suggests that the conclusion of an MEA could well be a key element to
determine the justification of certain measures under Article XX of the GATT” (WTO
2002a).   The EC particularly favours the Appellate Body observation (in the Gasoline
dispute)  that  WTO  rules  should  not  be  considered  in  “clinical  isolation”  of  other
international  law  and  that  Article  XX  must  be  interpreted  “in  light  of  contemporary
concerns  of  the  community  of  nations  about  the  protection  and  conservation  of  the
environment” has sanctified the acceptance of MEAs within the WTO system.  Thus, while
the EC is opposed to unilateralism (which US is prone to adopt), and remains a forceful
proponent of multilateral consensus in using trade measures on environmental grounds, the
wider interpretation of GATT Article XX exceptions in the recent disputes has appeal for
both the trading giants.34
II.5  Food Safety Trade Disputes under the WTO
Four food safety-related trade disputes have been settled under the WTO including:
(i)  Australia  –  Measures  Affecting  Importation  of  Salmon  (1998);  (ii)  EC  –  Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (1998); (iii) EC – Measures Affecting
Livestock  and  Meat  (Hormones)  (1998);  (iv)  Japan  –  Measures  Affecting  Agricultural
Products (1999).  All the health and safety-related trade disputes settled under the WTO
have involved developed countries.  The issue at stake in all the disputes was the use of
restrictive  sanitary  measures  based  on  precaution  without  appropriate  risk  assessment
and/or scientific evidence.
In the first dispute of Australia' s prohibition of imports of salmon from Canada
based  on  a  quarantine  regulation,  in  1995  Canada  alleged  that  the  prohibition  was
inconsistent with GATT and the Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures  (SPS  Agreement).    The  Dispute  Panel  found  that  Australia' s  measures  were
inconsistent with certain provisions of the SPS Agreement. After Australia’s appeal on the
Panel’s  interpretation,  the  Appellate  Body  ruled  that  the  Australian  prohibition  was
inconsistent with Articles 5.1 (risk assessment), 5.5 (non-discrimination), 2.2 (scientific
evidence) and 2.3 (non trade-restrictive) of the SPS Agreement.  Moreover, the Appellate
Body reversed the Panel' s finding that Australia had acted inconsistently with Article 5.6
of  the  SPS  Agreement,  since  factual  evidence  was  insufficient  to  support  such  a
conclusion.
In  the  case  of  Japanese  restrictions  on  agricultural  products,  the  US  alleged
violations under provisions of the SPS Agreement, GATT 1994, and the Agreement on
Agriculture. The Dispute Panel found that Japan acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2 and
5.6 of the SPS Agreement, and Annex B and, consequently, Article 7 (transparency) of the
SPS Agreement.  Following Japan’s appeal on the Panel’s interpretation of certain law, the
Appellate Body upheld the basic finding that Japan' s varietal testing of apples, cherries,
nectarines and walnuts is inconsistent with the requirements of the SPS Agreement.35
The two disputes on the use of hormones are especially relevant in relation to a
recent  multilateral  environmental  agreement,  the  Cartagena  Protocol  on  Biosafety,
considering hormone fed cattle as living modified organisms (LMOs).  In the first meat-
hormone dispute in 1996, the US complained that the measures taken by the EC under the
“Council Directive Prohibiting the Use in Livestock Farming of Certain Substances Having a
Hormonal Action” to  restrict imports of meat  and meat  products  were inconsistent  with
provisions  under  GATT  1994,  SPS  Agreement,  TBT  Agreement  and  the  Agreement  on
Agriculture. Similarly, in the second meat-hormones dispute, Canada complained that the
EC ban on importation of livestock and meat from livestock treated with certain substances
having a hormonal action violated provisions under the SPS; GATT; TBT; and Agreement
on Agriculture.
The final dispute ruling for the two cases found that the EC import prohibition on
beef from cattle raised on growth hormone was inconsistent with Articles 3.3 (scientific
justification  for  more  stringent  standards)  and  5.1  (risk  assessment)  of  the  SPS
Agreement.
22  The Appellate Body noted that studies on the specific hormones in question
failed to show how their use in growth promotion would result in hormone residue in beef
and the associated health risks. Moreover, the Appellate Body (as well as Panel) noted that
the hormone ban was inconsistent with the EC practice of permitting the use of two known
carcinogenic additives in feed for piglets.
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At the heart of the EC-hormone disputes was the issue of risk associated with the
introduction and consumption of genetically or living modified organisms in an importing
country.  The transboundary movement of LMOs is now covered by the Catagena Protocol
on Biosafety (in force since September 2003), which has been ratified by the EC, but not
the US or Canada.  Under the Protocol, a Party may choose not to import even if scientific
information is insufficient (emphasis added, Article 11.8).
24
                                                
22  Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases (WT/DS/OV/160), dated 17 October 2003: page 60-61.
23  This differential treatment, according to the US and Canada demonstrated the protectionist nature of the
ban, to take care of the condition of the EU market for meats.  (Kelly 2003)
24  See section 3.1 for a brief description of the Catagena Protocol on Biosafety.36
The  provision  in  the  Cartagena  Protocol  allowing  import  restriction  with
insufficient scientific information is potentially in conflict with the science-based provision
in the SPS Agreement.  Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows a Member to apply a
measure only on a provisional basis in case of insufficient scientific information, and a
Member  is  expected  to  review  such  measures  “within  a  reasonable  period  of  time”.
Considering  the  long-standing  difference  between  the  US  and  EC  on  the  issue  of
living/genetically  modified  organisms,  the  interpretative  decision  pursuant  to  the
negotiations under DMD Para 31 (i) will have a major bearing on trade disputes of this
nature.    It should be noted, however, that the Doha Declaration contains a condition,
stating negotiations on the clarification of relationship between trade measures in MEAs
and WTO rules should not disturb the rights of the WTO Members especially under the
Agreement  on  Application  of  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Measures.    In  other  words,
Article 11.8 of the Cartagena Protocol should not disturb the rights of a WTO Member like
the US (non- Party to the Protocol), as per Article 5.7 of the Agreement on Application of
Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Measures.    The  clause  in  the  DMD  safeguards  the  US
commercial interests against the provisions of the Catagena Protocol, since the US remains
the  foremost  proponent  of  research  and  practice  of  genetically  modified  crops  and
livestock.
III  Case of Six MEAs
Among  the  three  hundred  MEAs  existing  today,  about  thirty  contain  trade
measures.  Recently the WTO Secretariat released a matrix on trade measures pursuant to
fourteen selected MEAs (WTO 2003).  Some MEAs, however, like the Convention of the
Conservation  of  Antarctic  Marine  Living  Resources,  the  Convention  on  Biological
Diversity, and United Nations Framework Convention on Climatic Changes do not contain
any  trade-related  measures.    Other  treaties  contain  obligations  for  trade  measures  like
export or import certifications (for example the International Plant Protection Convention).
A few agreements like the International Tropical Timber Agreement and the International
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, have provision for developing trade37
measures.  Thus analysis by the WTO Members in the CTE has in particular focused on six
of these MEAs, which contain explicit trade obligations.
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Of these six MEAs, four are already in force and two are soon to come into force.
The four MEAs already enforced (also been ratified by India) include: the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species or CITES (1973); the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987); the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary  Movements  of  Hazardous  Wastes  and  their  Disposal  (1989);  and  the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000).  The two MEAs yet to come into force include the
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998) and the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001).
This  section  analyzes  the  trade  measures  contained  in  the  six  MEAs,  and  their
relationship with the environmental and health provisions under the GATT/WTO rules.
While clarification of the relationship between trade measures in MEA and WTO rules has
been sought in the WTO in the 1990s, the issue had been raised earlier too.  For example,
during the original negotiations of the Montreal Protocol in 1985-87, the parties sought to
clarify the relationship of the Protocol with respect to the GATT.
26  More recent MEAs
like the Cartagena Protocol state that the treaty is mutually supportive of the GATT/WTO
system: “trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to
achieving sustainable development” (Preamble to the Cartagena Protocol).  The Cartagena
Protocol  also  clarified  in  its  Preamble  that  the  “Protocol  shall  not  be  interpreted  as
implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international
agreements” and that “the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other
international agreements”, even though it contains provisions that are not consistent with
                                                
25  These six MEAs were identified by the United States in the October 2002 meeting of the CTE in Special
Session, as those that appear to contain specific trade obligations.
26  Consultations were held with a legal expert from the GATT Secretariat in April and September 1987.
The expert provided advise as to whether particular language was relatively closer to or further away
from traditional interpretations of the GATT, and stressed that “the judgment as to whether a proposed
action  to  implement  the  trade  restrictions  satisfied  Article  XX  lay  with  GATT  Contracting  Parties
normally in the context of a complaint by one GATT Party against another.”  Brack and Gray 2003: 20.38
some of the rules within the multilateral trading system as discussed below.  Section 3.1
outlines the goals and the trade provisions in the six MEAs, section 3.2 briefly discusses
the effectiveness of such measures in practice, and section 3.3 summarizes the rules within
the GATT/WTO compatible with the trade obligations under the six MEAs.
III.1  Objectives and Trade Provisions of the Six MEAs
The trade provisions in some of the MEAs are required to reduce environmental
harm: either because environmental degradation is directly related (say, negative product
effect) or indirectly related to trade.  For instance, the Basel Convention, the Cartagena
Protocol, the Rotterdam Conventions and the Stockholm Convention are associated with
the adverse product effects of trade, since the products crossing border is hazardous or
threatens to degrade the ecosystem of the destination countries.
The trade measures outlined in the CITES, on the other hand, can be associated
with adverse scale effect of trade (exploitation for exports driving extinction of species).
Yet another reason for the use of trade measures in MEA is to enforce the environmental
objective of the agreement.  For example, in the Montreal Protocol, trade is prevented
between  parties  and  non-parties  so  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  agreement  is  not
undermined (i.e. while domestic production of ozone depleting substances is controlled
among  parties,  the  production  is  not  shifted  to  non-parties  through  increased  imports).
Table 1 at the end of the section provides a summary of the objectives and trade provisions
of the six MEAs.
III.1.1  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna (1973)
The CITES was adopted in 1973 and came into force in 1975.  The CITES
seeks international cooperation for the protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora
against over-exploitation through international trade.  The trade measures incorporated in
the Convention are meant to prevent harmful practices like improper transport of these
species. In order to promote conservation of prioritized endangered species, trade measures39
include outright prohibition in commercial trade or restricted traffic in these species.  The
Convention distinguishes between three lists of species based on the threat of extinction:
Appendix I includes species threatened with extinction; Appendix II include species that
could be threatened with extinction unless trade is regulated; and Appendix III include all
species which any Party identifies as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction, and
requests cooperation of other Parties in the control of trade to prevent unsustainable or
illegal exploitation.  One or more Scientific Authorities of the State have to monitor the
trade of specimens of species threatened with extinction; and Management Authorities are
in charge of trade permits and certificates (Article IX).
The trade measures for the three types of species of the Convention are contained in
three articles (III, IV and V).  Trade in specimens of species in Appendix I is allowed only
on  condition  that  a  scientific  assessment  ascertains  such  export  and  import  are  not
detrimental to the survival of that species and that the specimen has not been obtained in
violation of the state’s law to protect such species. (Article III).   Trade in specimen of
species from Appendix II is allowed through permits
27 provided trade is not detrimental to
the survival of the species in the wild (Article IV).  Trade in species from Appendix III is
only allowed in these species with permits or certificates (Article V).  An import permit
corresponding to an export permit among Parties ensures the prevention of circumvention
to non-Parties (Article VI).
Article X allows trade with non-Parties on condition that the latter largely conforms
to requirements of the Convention and the trade is conducted with comparable documents.
Article  XIV.1  also  allows  a  Party  to  adopt  domestic  measures  restricting  trade  or
prohibiting trade in species (a) included in the three appendices; and (b) not included in
Appendix I, II or III.  The Standing Committee used Article XIV.1.a to impose import and
export prohibitions on CITES species in Thailand in 1991-92 and Italy in 1993 (PC-WTO
1994: 2).
                                                
27  No import permit is required for trade in species included in Appendix II, however, major importing
countries have instituted a system of import permits for trade in species on the basis of other conditions
and  non-CITES  related  criteria  like  tariffs,  health,  veterinary,  phytosanitary  and  animal  welfare
provisions. (WTO 2003: page 51)40
III.1.2  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987)
The Montreal Protocol was adopted in 1987 and came into force in 1989.  The
Protocol aims to reduce and finally eliminate the emissions of ozone depleting substances
from  anthropogenic  sources.    Under  the  Protocol’s  obligations,  parties  are  required  to
control  production  as  well  as  consumption  of  ozone  depleting  substances  (ODS).
28
Consumption is defined as the sum of domestic production and the net imports, thus the
Protocol requires the parties to control trade as well to comply with the phase-out of ODS.
After the phase-out date, the parties are to cease production of the controlled substance for
domestic consumption, other than for the use agreed by the parties to be essential.  The
Protocol’s provisions have been strengthened through four subsequent Amendments: in
London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Vienna (1995), Montreal (1997) and Beijing (1999),
which entered into force in the years 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2002 respectively.
The trade control with parties is contained in Article 4A of the Protocol, and states
that in case after the phase-out date applicable to the ODS, a Party is unable to comply
with its production obligations, then it shall ban the export of used, recycled and reclaimed
quantities  of  the  substances,  other  than  for  the  purpose  of  destruction.    Each  Party  is
obligated to implement a system for licensing import and export of ODS in Annexes A, B,
C and E (Article 4B).
Article 4 prohibits trade in ODS with non-parties:  As of 1990 each Party should
have banned the import of the controlled substances in Annex A (CFCs and halons) from
any State not Party to the Protocol.  Moreover, as of 1993, each Party should have banned
the export of any controlled substances in Annex A to any State not Party to the Protocol.
Similarly trade in Annex B substances (other CFCs) is banned with non-parties to the
                                                
28  The different types of ODS are listed in the annexes: Annex A lists Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and
Halons.  Annex B includes Carbon tetrachloride, Methyl chloroform and other CFCs.  Annex C lists
three  groups:  Group  I  -hydrochlorofluorocarbons  (HCFCs),  Group  II  -  hydrobromofluorocarbons
(HBFCs), and Group III -bromochloromethane.  Annex D contains Annex A substances banned from
May 1992.41
London Amendment (effective August 1993); and trade in Annex C substances (HCFCs,
HBFCs) are banned since June 1995 for non-parties (Copenhagen Amendment 1992).
III.1.3  Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal (1989)
The Basel Convention was adopted in 1989 and came into force in 1992.  The
Convention controls the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, to encourage the
treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes near the region of waste generation.  Under the
Convention,  parties  are  obliged  to  “ensure  that  transboundary  movement  of  hazardous
wastes is reduced to the minimum consistent with the environmentally sound and efficient
management of such wastes” (Article 4.2).  The hazardous wastes covered include those
listed in the Convention and as well as those defined as hazardous by domestic legislation
of parties.  An amendment to the Basel Convention, called the Ban Amendment, which is
yet  to  come  into  force,  added  a  preambular  paragraph  7  that  recognized  the  high  risk
especially to developing countries, which lack an environmentally sound management of
hazardous wastes as required by the Convention.
The trade measures pursuant to the Convention are contained in Article 4.  Under
the obligations, export of hazardous wastes is not permitted to parties that have prohibited
such import (Art 4.1b), and only allowed when the sate of import consents in writing (Art
4.1c).  Transboundary movement of hazardous wastes to Parties, especially developing
countries, is not allowed if there is reason to believe that the wastes in question will not be
managed in an environmentally sound manner (Art 4.2e). Trade in hazardous wastes, or
other wastes, is banned between a Party and non-Party (Art 4.5).  The trade among Parties
can  be  conducted  only  through  written  consent  to  import  after  an  export  notification
(Article  6).    The  Ban  Amendment  brought  in  the  new  Article  4A  (stronger  than
Convention’s  Article  4.2e),  under  which  a  Party  listed  in  Annex  VII  (OECD,  EC,
Liechtenstein) is prohibited all transboundary movements of hazardous wastes which are
destined for operations to States not listed in Annex VII (developing countries).42
Article 11.1 of the Convention allows for trade with non-Party, and a Party may
enter into bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements/ arrangements on transboundary
movement  of  hazardous  wastes  with  non-Parties,  provided  such  agreements  do  not
derogate from the environmentally sound management of  wastes as  required under the
treaty; and should notify the Secretariat of such agreements.  The largest exporter of wastes
in the world, namely the US, is not Party to the Basel Convention, trade with Parties under
this provision. For instance, Canada and Mexico (both parties to the Convention) have
bilateral agreements with the US (PC-WTO 1994: 4).
III.1.4  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000)
The Cartagena Protocol was adopted in 2000, and came into force in September
2003.    The  Protocol  is  a  supplementary  agreement  to  the  Convention  on  Biological
Diversity,  is  the  only  international  agreement  today  dealing  exclusively  with  living
modified organisms (LMOs)
29.  The objective is to contribute to the safe transfer, handling
and use of LMOs that may have adverse effects on biological diversity and pose a risk to
human health.  While the Protocol covers the transboundary movement of LMOs, it does
not include non-living products derived from LMOs, such as cooking oil from genetically
modified (GM) corn or ketchup from GM tomatoes.
The trade measures pursuant to the Protocol include prior notification and informed
consent essential for trade in LMOs:  Before the first shipment of LMOs, an exporting
Party  needs  to  follow  the  advance  informed  agreement  (AIA)  procedure,  and  provide
sufficient information for the importing parties to make an informed decision.  An export
notification (under Article 8) has to be followed by an acknowledgement of receipt of
notification (Article 9), and then the import decision (Article 10).   Parties are required to
use the Biosafety Clearing-House  to  fulfill  a  number  of  obligations,  including  specific
                                                
29  A LMO is defined in the Cartagena Protocol as any living organism that possesses a novel combination
of genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology.  Colloquially LMOs are usually
considered to be the same as GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms), for example, agricultural crops
genetically modified for greater productivity or for resistance to pests or diseases including tomatoes,
cassava, corn, cotton and soybeans.43
information on national biosafety laws; risk assessment summaries; and final decisions by
importing Parties with supporting reasons.
As noted earlier in section 2.5, the Protocol contains a provision that allows a Party
to ban import of LMOs for food or feed or processing that is inconsistent with the SPS
Agreement, even though the preamble of the Protocol states that it is mutually supportive
with the WTO agreements.  According to the Protocol the “(L)ack of scientific certainty
due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of
the  potential  adverse  effects  of  a  living  modified  organism  on  the  conservation  and
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking into account risks to
human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with
regard to the import of that living modified organism intended for direct use as food or
feed, or for processing, in order to avoid or  minimize such potential adverse effects.”
(Article  11.8)      The  risk  assessment,  of  course,  has  to  scientifically  sound  and  the
guidelines are provided in Annex III (Article 11.6).  Thus the Protocol has a wider scope
for import restriction compared to the SPS Agreement, under which food imports may be
provisionally restricted on the principle of precaution in the face of scientific uncertainty.
Article 14 of the Protocol allows bilateral/ regional/multilateral trading agreements
and arrangements on transboudary movement of LMOs, provided such agreement does not
result in a lower level of protection than that provided for by the Protocol.  Thus the
Protocol supports regionalism with more stringent standards on biosafety.
III.1.5  Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998)
The Rotterdam Convention on PIC, convened jointly by the UNEP and FAO, was
adopted in 1998, and will enter into force in February 2004.
30  The Convention promotes
the safe use of hazardous chemicals (through labeling standards, technical assistance), and
ensures  that  exporters  comply  with  the  requirements.    The  Convention  supports  the
                                                
30  Based on information in the website: http://www.pic.int/en/viewpage.asp.  India is not a Party to the
Rotterdam Convention.44
Agenda  21  principle  (chapter  19)  on  environmentally  sound  management  of  toxic
chemicals, and the hazardous substances covered by the Convention include banned or
severely  restricted  chemicals  and  hazardous  pesticides,  but  not  other  chemicals  like
narcotic  drugs,  radioactive  materials,  wastes,  food,  chemical  food  additives,  chemical
weapons,  pharmaceuticals,  and  chemicals  imported  in  reasonable  amounts  for  research
analysis/ personal use (Article 3).
The trade measures pursuant to the Convention include export ban on extremely
hazardous  chemicals,  and  export  notification  for  domestically  restricted  chemicals.    A
Party cannot export the chemicals listed in Annex III
31 from its territory (Article 11).  An
export notification has to be issued to the importing Party in case the chemical is banned or
restricted in the exporting Party’s own territory (Article 12).  Exporters need to obtain prior
informed consent from the state of import before proceeding with trade. Obligations for
imports include issuance of consent for import, or refusal or even interim import consent
based on appropriate legislative and administrative measures (Article 10).
III.1.6  Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)
The Stockholm Convention was adopted in May 2001, and is yet to come into force
(will come into force only after the 50
th Party ratifies the agreement).
32  Based on the
precautionary approach (Principle 15, Rio Declaration), the Convention aims to protect
human  health  and  the  environment  from  persistent  organic  pollutants  (POPs)
33  by
reducing/ eliminating their release.  The Stockholm Convention contains production and
consumption restrictions on the pollutants listed in its annexes:  Parties are required to
prohibit or take measures to eliminate the production and use of chemicals listed in Annex
A (e.g. aldrin, chlordane, dieldrin, mirex), and restrict the production/ use of chemicals in
                                                
31  Annex III lists chemicals as pesticides, severely hazardous pesticides, and industrial chemicals.  These
include  common  pesticides  like  aldrin,  chlordane,  DDT,  dieldrin,  lindane,  pentachlorophenol,
hexachlorobenzene, etc, used in developing countries like India.
32  India is a signatory (signed in May 2002) but has not accepted or ratified the agreement.
33  POPs are chemicals that remain intact in the environment for long periods, resist degradation, can travel
widely through air, water and migratory species and thus get distributed in distant geographical areas.
POPS accumulate in the fatty tissue of living organisms and are toxic to humans and wildlife.45
Annex  B  (e.g.  DDT).    Annex  C  lists  chemicals  unintentionally  produced  from
anthropogenic sources, say during the manufacture of paper and pulp, or incineration of
wastes, particularly medical waste.
Trade obligations pursuant to the Convention requires each Party to prohibit and/ or
take  legal  and  administrative  measures  necessary  to  eliminate  import  and  export  of
chemicals listed in Annex A (Article 3.1 a).  The import and export of chemicals in Annex
A  or  B  is  allowed  only  for  the  purpose  of  environmental  sound  disposal  or  for  the
designated use permitted in these annexes (Article 3.2 a, b i, ii).  A chemical listed in
Annex A, for which production and use specific exemptions are no longer in effect for a
Party, cannot be exported except for environmentally sound disposal (Article 3.2 c). The
Protocol allows a Party to export Annex A or B chemicals to a non-Party on condition that
the latter conform to some of the Protocol’s provisions (Article 3.2 b iii).
Selected WTO Members and Ratification of the Six MEAs
The potential conflict between the multilateral trading  rules and trade measures
pursuant to MEAs triggered speculation that countries may choose not to participate in
environmental treaties in future (also called the chill effect).  While Western European
nations are well-known to be proponents of environmental initiatives, most developing
countries (as well as least developed countries) have also been Parties to the major MEAs
existing today.   However, not all major WTO Members are Party to all the major MEAs.
Table 2 provides the ratification of selected WTO Members, including Australia, China,
EC, India, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, Switzerland, and US.
The  WTO  Members  listed  in  Table  2,  represent  some  of  the  countries  whose
proposals on paragraph 31 (i) of the DMD are discussed in section 4 later.  In particular,
Norway  and  Switzerland  have  accepted  or  ratified  all  the  six  MEAs  (including  the
amendments), followed closely by the EC.  Japan has accepted four of the MEAs (though
not  all  amendments)  but  not  the  Cartegena  Protocol  and  the  Rotterdam  Convention.
Australia has ratified three of these treaties, including CITES, Montreal and the Basel.  The
US,  has  so  far  ratified  only  two  of  the  six  MEAs,  namely  the  CITES  and  Montreal46
Protocol.  China has ratified three of the MEAs, including the CITES, Montreal and the
Basel (as well as the Ban Amendment).  In comparison, India has accepted all but two of
these MEAs, namely the Rotterdam Convention and the Stockholm Convention.   India,
however, has not ratified the Ban Amendment under the Basel Convention).  Malaysia has
accepted five of these MEAs (including the Ban Amendment under the Basel Convention,
but not the amendments under CITES), but not the Stockholm Convention on POPs.47
Table 1: Six Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Objectives, Membership
34 and Trade Measures
Particulars of the Multilateral Environmental Agreement Trade Obligations
i) Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1973)
Objective  to  protect  endangered  species  against  exploitation  through
international  trade,  and  regulate  international  trade  in  wildlife  for
conservation (especially non-endangered species in the international market
that could become endangered without trade regulation).
Entry into force: 1975
Membership: 1973 Convention with 164 parties,
   1979 Bonn Amendment with 126 parties (entered into force 1987);
   1983 Gaborone Amendment with 70 parties (not in force).
Article III: (2) export (3) import and (4) re-export in any specimen of species
listed in Appendix I (threatened with extinction, is allowed through prior grant
and  presentation  of  a  permit  only  after  scientifically  assessed  that  such  trade
would be non-detrimental to the species.
Article IV: (2) Export and (5) re-export of specimens in Appendix II species (that
may become endangered unless controlled) regulated through export permits and
after  scientific  assessment.  (3)  Scientific  Authority  of  State  to  monitor  actual
exports and export permits. (4) Imports require supporting export permits.
Article V: (2) Export, (3) import and (4) re-export in species listed in Appendix III
(identified by a Party for regulation within its own jurisdiction) through permits.
Article VI:  Guidelines for permits and certificates for trade.
ii) Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987)
Objective  to  reduce  and  eliminate  anthropogenic  emissions  of  ozone
depleting  substances,  and  develop  a  regime  to  limit  the  release  of  ozone
depleting substances into the atmosphere.
Entry into force: 1989
Membership: 1987 Protocol with 186 parties;
   1990 London Amendment with 171 parties;
   1992 Copenhagen Amendment with 159 parties;
   1997 Montreal Amendment with 113 parties;
   1999 Beijing Amendment with 66 parties.
(The four Amendments entered into force in 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2002
respectively)
Article 4: Parties to ban (1) import (as of January 1990) and (2) export (as of
1993) of controlled substances in Annex A with non-parties.
Trade ban with non parties of substances in: Annex B from August 1993 (London
Amendment);  Annex  C  Group  II  from  June  1995  (Copenhagen  Amendment);
Annex C Group III after February 2003 and Annex C Group I from January 2004
(Beijing Amendment).
Trade  ban  in  HCFCs  with  countries  which  have  not  ratified  Copenhagen
Amendment (Beijing Amendment)   
Article 4A: (1) Parties unable to cease production of controlled substance in the
applicable  time,  despite  all  steps,  shall  ban  export  of  new/  used/  recycled/
reclaimed quantities of the substance except for destruction.
Article 4B: (1) Parties shall implement licensing system for import and export of
new, used, recycled, reclaimed controlled substances in Annexes A, B, C & E.
                                                
34  Refers to the number of parties that have ratified/ accepted a treaty as of January 2004, based on information in the concerned MEA website.48
iii) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989)
Objective  to  promote  environmentally  sound  management  of  hazardous
wastes, and reduce transboundary movements of hazardous wastes to protect
human  health  and  the  environment  from  adverse  effects  from  handling,
transport and disposal of hazardous wastes.  Also minimize the generation in
terms of quantity and hazardousness of wastes.
Entry into force: May 1992.
Membership: Convention with 159 parties.
   1995 Ban Amendment with 42 parties, not yet in force.
   1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage has only
             14 signatories, not in force.
Article  4.1:    (a)  Inform  other  parties  of  the  decision  to  prohibit  import  of
hazardous  wastes  for  disposal.  (b)  Prohibit  the  export  of  hazardous  wastes  to
Parties that have notified import prohibition of those substances, or (d)  have not
consented in writing to the specific import.
Article 4.2: (d) ensure transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is minimized
consistent with environmentally sound and efficient management of wastes; (e)
Ban  export  of  hazardous  wastes  to  parties,  especially  developing  countries,  if
wastes in question will not be managed in an environmentally sound manner, or if
import  is  prohibited  by  domestic  legislation;  (g)  prevent  import  of  hazardous
wastes  in  case  wastes  will  not  be  managed  in  an  environmentally  sustainable
manner.
Article 4.5: Party shall ban trade of hazardous wastes with a non-Party.
Article 4.7: Party shall (a) prohibit all persons in its national jurisdiction from
transporting hazardous wastes unless authorized; and ensure trade in hazardous
wastes is (b) packaged, labeled; (c) accompanied by documents.
Article  4.8:  Exporting  Party  shall  ‘  require  that  wastes  are  managed  in
environmentally sound manner in state of import.
Article  6:  (1,  2,  3,  4)  Prior  information  consent  procedure  for  trade  between
parties, (9, 10, 11) procedure on receipt of wastes, covered by insurance.
Article 8: Duty to re-import by State of export if the wastes cannot be disposed in
an environmentally sound disposal.
Article 9: (2, 3, 4) In case of illegal traffic of hazardous wastes, responsible Party
(exporting or importing) or concerned parties will dispose of wastes.
iv)  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000)
Objective: Adequate level of protection in the field of safe transfer, handling
and use if  LMOs that  may  have adverse  effects  on  the  conservation  and
sustainable  use  of  biological  diversity,  taking  also  into  account  risks  to
human health.
Entry into force: September 2003
Membership:  84 parties
     (Party to the Protocol has to be a Party to the Convention on Biodiversity)
Article 7: (1) Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) to apply to first intentional
movement of LMOs (other than food or feed)
Article 8: Export notification in writing for LMOs other than food or feed.
Article 9: Acknowledgement of export receipt in writing,
Article 10: (1-4) Import decision procedure for LMO (not food or feed).
Article 11: (1,2,5) Import decision procedure for LMO (food/ feed)
Article 14.2: Parties shall inform others of bilateral/ regional/ multilateral trade
arrangements they have entered into before or after this Protocol.
Article 18.2: (a, b, c) Party to ensure documentation accompanies LMOs.49
v) Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade (1998)
Objective: Promote shared responsibility and cooperative effort in the
international trade of certain hazardous chemicals to protect human health
and the environment from potential human harm and encourage
environmentally sound use, by facilitating information exchange about their
characteristics, by providing for a national decision-making process on their
import and export and by disseminating these decisions to Parties.
Entry into force: to enter into force from 24 February 2004.
Membership:  59 parties
Article 5: (1, 2) Parties shall notify the Secretariat in writing of regulatory action
and information on chemicals (banned or severely restricted or hazardous) that are
to be subject to the prior informed consent procedure.
Article 10:  Parties shall (2, 4, 7) notify Secretariat a response on future import of
the chemicals listed in Annex III; and (9) decide on the import of the chemical
from any source.
Article 11.2: Party shall ensure that a chemical listed in Annex III is not exported
from its territory to an importing Party even if latter fails to respond.
Article 12: (1-4) Party shall provide export notification for chemicals banned or
severely restricted in its own territory, providing information set out in Annex V.
Obligation ceases when chemical is listed in Annex III.
Article 13.2: Each Party shall require that chemicals (in Annex III or those
domestically banned or severely restricted) are labeled according to international
standards.
vi) Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001)
Objective: Reduction or elimination of releases of persistent organic
pollutants into the environment.
Entry into force:  not yet in force.
Membership:  48 parties
Article 3.1: (a) (ii) Each Party shall prohibit and/ or take legal and administrative
measures necessary to eliminate import and export of chemicals listed in Annex
A.
Article 3.2: (a, b) Each Party to ensure that import or export of chemical listed in
Annex A or B occurs only for purpose of environmentally sound disposal or for
use permitted for the Party under Annex A or B; (c) For a Annex A chemical, for
which production or use exemption is no longer in effect, is not exported except
for the purpose of environmentally sound disposal.
Source: Compiled from information in the websites of the respective MEAs (as of January 2004) and WTO (2003).50
Table 2: Six MEAs: Ratification Status of Selected WTO Members
MEA and year enforced Australia China EC India Japan Malaysia Norway Switzerland US
CITES, 1975 r 1976 ac 1981 -* r 1976 at 1980 ac 1977 r 1976 r 1974 r 1974
  Bonn Amendment, 1987   1986 1997 -* 1980 1980 - 1979 1981 1980
  Gaborone Amendment   1991 1988 -* 1989 - - 1984 1994 -
Montreal Protocol, 1989 r 1989 ac 1991 ap 1988 ac 1992 at 1988 ac 1989 r 1988 r 1988 r 1988
  London Amendment, 1992 at 1992 ac 1991 ap 1991 ac 1992 at 1991 ac 1993 r 1991 r 1992 r 1991
  Copenhagen Amendment, 1994 at 1994 ac 2003 ap 1995 ac 2003 at 1994 ac 1993 r 1993 r 1996 r 1994
  Montreal Amendment, 1999 at 1999 - ap 2000 ac 2003 at 2002 r  2001 r 1998 r 2002 r 2003
  Beijing Amendment, 2002 - - ap 2002 ac 2003 at 2002 r  2001 r 2001 r 2002 r 2003
Basel Convention, 1992 ac 1992 r 1991 ap 1994 r 1992 ac 1993 at 1993 r 1990 r 1990 -
   Ban Amendment - r 2001 ap 1997 - - r  2001 at 2001 at 2002 -
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 2003 - - ap 2002 r 2003 ac 2003 r  2003 r 2001 r 2002 -
Rotterdam Convention on PIC, 2004 - - ap 2002 - - at 2002 at 2001 r 2002 -
Stockholm Convention on POPs - - -* - at 2002 r 2002 r 2003 -
Source:  Compiled from “Ratification Status” of the websites of the multilateral environmental agreements:
CITES Secretariat (http://www.cites.org/eng/parties/index.shtml); UNEP Ozone Secretariat  (http://www.unep.org/ozone/ratif.shtml); Secretariat of
Basel Convention (http://www.basel.int/ratif/ratif.html); Biosafety Protocol (http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx); Rotterdam Convention
on PIC (http://www.pic.int/en/viewpage.asp); Stockholm Convention http://www.pops.int/documents/signature/signstatus.htm
* Some EU members like Austria, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden, however, have accepted/ acceded or ratified the MEAs.
ac = accession; ap = approval; at = accepted; r = ratified. Ratification, acceptance and approval are legally equivalent actions but are only applicable in
relation to the States that signed the MEA when it was opened for signature.  Acceptance and approval are the actions taken by certain States when, at
national level, constitutional law does not require a treaty to be "ratified". The term accession is used in relation to the States that did not sign the
Convention initially.51
III.2  Effectiveness of Trade Measures Pursuant to MEAs
Although  trade  restrictions  are  used  as  instruments  in  MEAs  to  help  acheive
environmental conservation, it is widely recognized that trade measures are neither the most
efficient  nor  the  most  effective  means  of  achieving  an  environmental  goal  since
international trade per se may not be the cause driving the environmental degradation.  Not
surprisingly, the environmental worth of trade measures in MEAs has typically been low on
evaluation of their effectiveness. This was evident from the evaluation of trade obligations
under the CITES to preserve endangered species of flora and fauna (UNCTAD 2000).  The
threat to endangered species is driven by not just the destruction of the species directly but
also indirectly through the destruction of habitat of the species.  Sometimes, conditional
trade restrictions have also induced exploitation and illegal trade. For instance, while the
CITES prohibits trade in wild orchids, it allows trade in cultivated flowers, which has led to
illegal trade in some rare species.
Similarly, the Basel Convention, intended to eliminate the problem of dumping of
hazardous wastes from industrialized countries to developing countries, ignored the fact
that a number of developing countries are increasingly becoming generators of hazardous
waste.    Rapid  industrialization  in  developing  countries  has  been  accompanied  by  an
increasing demand for secondary retrievable material from certain wastes (especially lead
and zinc wastes) and the ban on export of hazardous wastes from OECD countries under
the  Basel  Convention  has  enhanced  the  existing  trade  of  hazardous  wastes  among
developing countries (UNCTAD 2000: 10).  It is noteworthy that since the largest exporter
of waste worldwide, the US, is not a Party to the Basel Convention, it undermines the
essential goal of the Convention.  More importantly, the Basel Convention has failed to52
promote environmentally sound hazardous waste management in developing countries
35,
even though it may have reduced the flow of wastes from European developed nations to
the developing countries.
The Basel Convention has created much discontent among industrializing countries
about the wastes listed as “hazardous” in the Convention.  Some of the wastes, listed as
hazardous in the Convention, contain recyclable materials like lead acid and zinc ash.  The
ban  being  wide,  it  precludes  extraction  of  recyclable  materials  in  the  industrializing
countries through waste import.  Questions have been raised whether such a ban would be
able  to  promote  environmentally  sound  hazardous  waste  management  in  developing
countries  (one  of  the  goals  of  the  Convention),  since  the  demand  for  cheaper  recycled
metals in industry as opposed to virgin mined metal still remain.   According to analysts of
MEAs  (Brack  and  Gray,  2003:  13),  flexibility  is  both  desirable  and  also  workable  as
demonstrated in the one-off sales of elephant ivory permitted under CITES, or allowing
trade in farmed or ranched species.
Trade measures, however, continue to play an important role in these MEAs, and
the concern within the WTO is that the trade measures can affect WTO Members’ rights
and  obligations  (WTO  1996:  2).    Indeed,  the  MEAs  negotiated  in  the  post-WTO  era,
especially the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000), the Rotterdam Convention on Prior
Informed Consent (1998), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(2001),  contain  statements  in  their  respective  Preambles  that  reinforce  the  mutual
supportiveness of trade and environment, and that the MEA does not change the rights and
obligations of the parties under existing international agreement.
                                                
35  The Preamble to the Convention recognized the “increasing desire for the prohibition of transboundary
movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal in other States, especially developing countries”, and
“the need to promote the transfer of technology for the sound management of hazardous wastes and other
wastes produced locally, particularly to the developing countries in accordance with the spirit of the
Cairo Guidelines and decision 14/16 of the Governing Council of UNEP on Promotion of the transfer of
environmental protection technology” (emphasis added).  The  Convention  considered  “that  enhanced
control of transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes will act as an incentive for
their environmentally sound management and for the reduction of the volume of such transboundary
movement”. (Preamble to the Basel Convention)53
III.3  Trade Obligations in MEAs and Compatible WTO Provisions
Most  of  the  trade  obligations  applied  amongst  Parties  in  the  six  multilateral
environmental agreements discussed in section 3.1 are compatible with the provisions in the
GATT/WTO.  The quantitative trade restrictions in the MEAs are justified under the GATT
Article  XX  exceptions  to  protect  exhaustible  or  depletable  natural  resources,  and  the
labeling  requirements  fall  under  the  category  of  technical  regulations  in  the  TBT
Agreement.  Moreover, since the GATT/WTO provides its Members the autonomy to adopt
environmental policies in support of sustainable development, any domestic environmental
legislation requiring a ban on trade of hazardous substance, say under Basel or Rotterdam
Convention, would be consistent with the multilateral trading rules.
Four of the MEAs discussed here require prior informed consent to international
trade, namely, the Basel Convention, the Cartagena Protocol, the Rotterdam Convention,
and the Stockholm Convention.  The prior consent requirements are conditions to the entry
into a country’s market, and can be viewed as conditional market access requirements or
binding technical requirements on trade. As conditional market access requirements they
are covered by the prohibition under Article XI of GATT 1994, but are justifiable under
GATT  Article  XX.    As  binding  technical  requirements  they  are  covered  by  the  TBT
Agreement.    The  prior  informed  consent  notification  requires  detailed  product
characteristics/  information,  which  clearly  come  under  the  definition  of  technical
regulations (Annex 1.1, TBT Agreement).
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There  are, however, some inconsistencies, for  example  the  differential  treatment
among Parties in the Basel Convention, or the precautionary basis of import refusal in the
Cartagena Protocol.  Another aspect inconsistent with the GATT/WTO trade rules results
from the discrimination between Parties and non-Parties obligatory in the Basel Convention
                                                
36  The general interpretative note to Annex 1A of the Multilateral Agreements on the Trade in Goods of the
of the Uruguay Round Final Act states that:  “In the event of conflict between a provision of the General
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  1994  and  a  provision  of  another  agreement  in  Annex  1A  to  the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in the agreement in Annex 1A as the
"WTO Agreement"), the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.”
Thus, if a measure is consistent with the TBT agreement (one of the agreements in Annex 1A), it will
prevail even if there is an apparent inconsistency with another provision of the GATT.54
and the Montreal Protocol.  Since all of the Members of the GATT/WTO are not parties to
such an MEA the Party vs non-Party issue violates the GATT Article I (MFN clause).
The  consistency  of  trade  measures  under  MEAs  with  GATT/WTO  rules  is
important especially where the Parties to an MEA constitute only a subset of the WTO
Members.  It may be noted that Article 41 of the Vienna Convention allows “two or more
of the parties to a multilateral treaty” to conclude an agreement “to modify the treaty as
between themselves” as long as such a modification is either provided by the original treaty
(Article 41.1 a) or not prohibited in the treaty  (Article 41.1 b).  The  conditions of  the
current  WTO  negotiations  fall  under  Article  41.1  b  of  the  Vienna  Convention,  which
requires that the new treaty among the subset of parties “(i) does not affect the enjoyment
by  the  other  parties  of  their  rights  under  the  treaty  or  the  performance  of  their
obligations;”  and  “(ii)  does  not  relate  to  a  provision,  derogation  from  which  is
incompatible  with  the  effective  execution  of  the  object  and  purpose  of  the  treaty  as  a
whole.”
The GATT/WTO rules compatible with the trade measures pursuant to each of the
six MEAs (among Parties) are briefly discussed below, and listed in Table 3 at the end of
the section:
CITES:    The  commercial  trade  prohibition  of  species  listed  in  Appendix  I
(threatened with extinction) and the regulated trade of species in Appendices II (endangered
unless regulated) are consistent with GATT Article XX (g) to conserve the exhaustible
natural  resources  in  conjunction  with  domestic  regulations.    The  regulation  of  trade  in
Appendix III species (identified by Party within its own jurisdiction) is consistent with
GATT  Article  XX  (d).  The  specifications  on  export  and  import  permits  are  technical
regulations falling under the TBT Agreement.
Montreal Protocol:  The trade ban of ozone depleting substances between parties
and non-parties may be justifiable under GATT Article XX (b) and (g), given the domestic
control  of  production  and  consumption  of  ODS  in  the  economy  of  the  Party  (and55
considering the broad interpretation of the exceptions in the Gasoline dispute). Under the
Montreal Protocol, the domestic producers of the parties are subject to restrictions on ODS
production,  and  National  Treatment  may  allow  discrimination  with  non-parties  of  the
Protocol.
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Basel Convention: The ban on export of hazardous and other wastes to countries
which have prohibited the import of such wastes (Article 4.1), and the obligation to re-
import in case the state of import cannot dispose of the wastes in a sustainable manner
(Article  8)  seems  consistent  under  GATT  Article  XX  (b).    The  ban  on  export  from
developed to developing countries or parties where environmentally sound management of
waste is not followed (Article 4.2 e), would be consistent with GATT Article XX (b), but
based on an extra-jurisdictional argument of minimizing the risk to human health in the
developing countries.
The Convention requires that the state of export notify “competent authority of the
States concerned of any proposed transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other
wastes” and the notification should “contain the declarations and information specified in
Annex V A” (Article 6.1).  Among other information, the notification is should provide
information on the “designation and physical description of the waste including Y number
and UN number and its composition and information on any special handling requirements
including emergency provisions in case of accidents” (Annex VA.13).  The notification
requirement  is  mandatory  and  would  seem  to  fall  under  the  TBT  Agreement.    The
notification requirement does not infringe any GATT rule as long as it does not have a
restrictive effect.
                                                
37  A sub-group of the Protocol had provisionally concluded that the proposed trade measures against non-
parties could be justifiable under GATT Article XX (b) and possibly XX (g), and the GATT Secretariat at
the time had not objected to the proposed trade measures. In 1996, however, the Director of the WTO
Trade and Environment Division questioned the necessity and efficacy of the Protocol’s trade provisions,
and suggesting that they would not be saved by Article XX exceptions.  In 1999, the Ozone Secretariat
issued a communication to the WTO CTE, that the measures against non-parties could be defended under
Article XX since the ozone layer is an exhaustible natural resource. Brack and Gray (2002): page 20.56
Cartagena Protocol:  The Advance Informed Agreement of the Protocol requires
that “The Party of export shall notify, or require the exporter to ensure notification to, in
writing, the competent national authority of the Party of import prior to the intentional
transboundary movement of a living modified organism … . The notification shall contain,
at  a  minimum,  the  information  specified  in  Annex  I”  (Article  8.1).    The  information
requirements specified in Annex I include product characteristics like the “identity of the
living modified organism”, “description of the nucleic acid or the modification introduced,
the technique used, and the resulting characteristics of the living modified organism”, as
well as “suggested methods for the safe handling,  storage,  transport  and  use,  including
packaging,  labelling,  documentation,  disposal  and  contingency  procedures,  where
appropriate”.  The Advanced Informed Agreement of the Protocol would seem to fall under
the  exception  in  Article  XX  (b).    The  accompanying  documentation  on  product
characteristics during trade of LMOs, are technical regulations consistent with the TBT
Agreement.
On the other hand, the decision to import LMOs for food/feed would correspond to
Article  2  of  the  SPS  Agreement  and  Article  XX  (b).    However,  the  provision  for  the
precautionary principle outlined in the Protocol for food/ feed LMOs in Article 11.8, which
that allows decision based on insufficient scientific evidence (reflects Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration), is different to the precautionary principle contained in the SPS.  The SPS
Article 5.7 does allow for the use of precaution when scientific evidence is insufficient to
establish safety, but such measures can be adopted only on a provisional basis!
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Rotterdam Convention:  As noted earlier, prior informed consent requirement is not
consistent with Article XI.1 of GATT 1994, but can be justified under Article XX (b) and
(d) to protect health and to secure compliance with domestic regulations.  The Convention
also requires that the export of chemicals be accompanied with documented information:
“Without prejudice to any requirements of the importing Party, each Party shall require that
both  chemicals  listed  in  Annex  III  and  chemicals  banned  or  severely  restricted  in  its
                                                
38  Six grain exporting countries, the Miami Group (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Uruguay and US),
opposed the ratification of the Cartagena Protocol due to the apprehensions that it would limit trade.57
territory  are,  when  exported,  subject  to  labelling  requirements  that  ensure  adequate
availability  of  information  with  regard  to  risks  and/or  hazards  to  human  health  or  the
environment,  taking  into  account  relevant  international  standards.”  (Article  13.2)  The
product labeling of the consignment is consistent with the TBT Agreement.
The  provision  on  declaration  of  domestically  prohibited/  restricted  hazardous
chemicals (Article 12) relates to the issue of domestically prohibited goods (DPGs) in the
GATT/WTO. The concern for export in DPGs was first taken up in the GATT in 1982, and
although a notification system was set up, the system failed to work effectively. The issue
of DPGs is one of the items in the work agenda of the CTE and is yet to be resolved.
Stockholm  Convention:  The  export  and  import  prohibition  (to  support  the  MEA
objective of elimination/ limiting identified pollutants, just as in the Montreal Protocol)
would be justifiable under Article XX (b) exceptions. The Convention allows for limited
trade (for permitted use and/or final disposal) in “a chemical listed in Annex A for which
any production or use specific exemption is in effect or a chemical listed in Annex B for
which any production or use specific exemption or acceptable purpose is in effect, taking
into  account  any  relevant  provisions  in  existing  international  prior  informed  consent
instruments” (Article 3.2.b).  The information requirement and screening criteria (Annex D)
for a Party to list a chemical as POP in Annex A/ B include detailed product characteristics.
Thus for a Party exporting a chemical which it has listed in Annex A/B, the applicable
WTO provision is the TBT Agreement.
Table 3. Trade Obligations in MEAs and Compatible GATT/WTO provisions
Multilateral Environmental Agreement Compatible provision under WTO
1.  CITES Article XX (d), (g)
2.  Montreal Protocol Article XX (b), (g)
3.  Basel Convention Article XX (b), (d), TBT
4.  Cartagena Protocol Article XX (b), TBT and SPS*
5.  Rotterdam Convention (PIC) Article XX (b), (d), TBT
6.  Stockholm Convention (POPs) Article XX (b) and TBT
* Cartagena Protocol Article 11.8 allows import restrictions with insufficient scientific information (principle
of precaution), but Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement allows only provisional food import restrictions in the
face of scientific uncertainty.58
IV  WTO Deliberations on MEAs and Trade Rules
This  section  summarizes  the  submissions  made  by  WTO  Members  on  the
relationship between trade measures pursuant  to  MEAs  and  WTO  rules  for  almost  one
decade since 1995. The issue was first taken up within the GATT in 1991 under the EMIT.
The Sub-Committee on Trade and Environment (under the Preparatory Committee for the
WTO) towards the end of the Uruguay Round built on the initial exchange of information,
and began the work on the question of consistency between trade measures pursuant to
MEAs with the multilateral trade rules.  The issue was then itemized (item i) in the CTE
work agenda, and WTO Members began deliberating through unofficial papers as well as
official  proposals.    In  the  Doha  Ministerial  in  2001,  the  issue  was  finally  put  on  the
negotiating agenda of the WTO (paragraph 31 i), and the Members continue their efforts to
resolve the relationship between obligatory trade measures pursuant to MEAs and WTO
rules.
IV.1  CTE Discussions prior to Doha
 After the discussions on item (i) of the CTE work agenda began on the issue of the
scope of WTO provisions to use such trade measures for environmental purposes, in 1996
several Members including the EC,  Hong  Kong,  India,  Korea,  Switzerland  and  the  US
submitted non-papers (unofficial papers), while ASEAN, Japan and New Zealand submitted
official proposals.  Before the Doha Ministerial in November 2001, however, more formal
proposals  were  submitted  on  this  item,  in  particular  by  the  EC,  New  Zealand,  and
Switzerland.
In  one  of  the  first  contributions  under  CTE  item  (i),  the  EC  suggested  the
development of an Understanding on the recognition of an MEA as an international written
instrument  adopted  in  conformity  with  the  customary  international  law  aimed  to  solve
environmental problems.  The paper also suggested an amendment to the GATT Article XX
by adding a new paragraph (k) to allow for the application of trade measures pursuant to an
MEA (EC non paper, 19 February 1996).  Alternatively, GATT Article XX (b) could be59
amended to explicitly include protection of the environment and measures taken pursuant
to specific provisions of MEAs; along with an Understanding.  The MEA, according to the
EC,  had  to  be  open  to  participation  to  all  parties  concerned  about  the  environmental
objectives  of  the  agreement  and  reflect  adequate  participation  of  parties  with  relevant
significant trade and economic interests.  Both options proposed by the EC constituted a
radical  change  through  an  amendment  of  the  GATT  Article  XX,  and  making  a  legal
framework for “de jure compatibility of trade measures taken pursuant to MEAs” without
questioning  whether  such  trade  measures  are  necessary  to  achieve  the  environmental
objective of the MEA.
In  a  later  formal  submission,  the  EC  sought  confirmation  that  “WTO  rules  and
MEAs are separate but equal bodies of international law and that, accordingly, MEAs are
not  subordinate  to  WTO  rules  and  vice  versa”  (para  14,  WTO  2000).    While  the  EC
opposed “eco-protectionism”, the proposal suggested the “reversal of the burden of proof”
in order to accommodate specifically mandated trade measures pursuant to MEAs.  This
meant that a country challenging a measure taken by a trading partner would have to prove
that the measure does not meet the conditions of Article XX.  Effectively, the EC proposal
considered  the  specific  trade  measures  mandated  in  MEAs  not  only  to  be  de  jure
compatible with GATT Article XX conditions, but a WTO Member challenging such a
measure would need to that it was not compatible contrary to practice.
While  not  suggesting  an  amendment  of  the  GATT  Article  XX  like  the  EC,
Switzerland proposed a Coherence Clause similar to EC’s proposed Understanding (non
paper 1996).  The Coherence Clause would apply in case of a conflict between WTO rules
and  a  specific  trade  provision  of  an  MEA  to  ensure  that  the  applied  measure  did  not
constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, but would not question either the
legitimacy or the necessity of the trade measure.  In 2000, Switzerland officially proposed
this idea as an interpretative decision on mutual supportiveness and deference between the
WTO and MEAs, whereby a trade measure under an MEA would be presumed to be in
conformity with WTO rules, but only its implementation would remain subject to WTO
requirements.60
The  first  official  proposal  was  made  by  New  Zealand  (February  1996)  and
suggested  that  Members  develop  an  Understanding  to  accommodate  trade  measures
pursuant to MEAs provided certain substantive criteria were satisfied.  In particular, an
MEA should reflect a genuine multilateral consensus requiring equitable participation to all
interested countries, representing various geographical areas as well as varying levels of
development.  New Zealand distinguished between specifically mandated trade measures
within MEAs versus non-specific measures, and also those applied between Parties and
those against non-Parties.  The substantive criteria for specifically mandated trade measures
within  Parties  were  to  ensure  that  the  measures  were  necessary  to  achieve  the
environmental objective of the MEA (considering effectiveness of the measure in achieving
the environmental objective; whether the measure is least-restrictive or distorting; and the
proportionality of the measure to the need for trade restriction to achieve the environmental
objective).
The substantive criteria for the MEA (effectiveness and proportionality) outlined by
New  Zealand  made  the  proposed  Understanding  different  from  that  of  the  EC  or
Switzerland, since the latter presumed trade measures pursuant to an MEA to be necessary
and in conformity with the GATT Article XX.  Similar to New Zealand, Korea suggested
that only specific trade measures applied among Parties of an MEA should be eligible for
consideration within the WTO through a qualified codification on a time-basis.
In 1996, the ASEAN submitted a proposal for a waiver option within the WTO,
while distinguishing between specific and non-specific trade measures pursuant to MEAs
(like New Zealand and Korea).  The proposed multi-year waiver on a case-by-case basis
was  subject  to  non-binding  guidelines,  including  necessity,  least-trade  restrictiveness,
effectiveness, proportionality and the degree of scientific evidence.  The waiver could be
extended annually until its termination.  The proposal suggested that as Members learnt and
revisited  the  issue  over  time,  a  more  substantive  alternative  may  emerge  in  the  future.
Since effectiveness and efficiency of discriminatory trade measures pursuant to MEAs are
still  questionable  (for  example  those  under  the  Basel  Convention  discussed  earlier  in61
section  3.2),  the  ASEAN  proposal  was  a  “measured  and  incremental  response”  to
accommodate such measures within the WTO.
It is significant to note that the ASEAN reinforced the fact that the WTO was a trade
regulating  body,  and  the  GATT  1994  in  the  context  of  trade  can  be  regarded  as  “lex
specialis derogate generali” (the more specific agreement in relation to trade) in case of a
WTO dispute regarding infringement of Member  right following the implementation  of
trade  measures  pursuant  to  MEAs.    The  case-by-case  waiver  option,  according  to  the
ASEAN,  offered  to  the  WTO  and  MEA  authorities  a  “flexible  approach”  whereby  the
interests  of  both  regimes  could  be  preserved  –  MEA  negotiators  could  still  use
discriminatory  trade  measures  if  absolutely  necessary  to  achieve  their  environmental
objectives, and WTO Members would retain the right to raise justifiable trade implications
within the WTO through its dispute settlement mechanism.  More importantly, both the
regimes  could  work  towards  greater  coordination  in  the  achievement  of  their  differing
objectives.
Hong Kong also proposed the option of a waiver on condition that certain criteria
were satisfied (non-paper, 22 July 1996).  The proposal suggested the creation of a factual
reference guide containing WTO principles by the WTO Secretariat, which could be used
by MEA negotiators in their consideration of proposed trade measures.  All measures taken
under  MEAs  would  be  eligible  for  a  waiver  provide  they  satisfied  certain  consistency
criteria (for specific trade measures they included (i) wide participation in the negotiation of
the MEA, (ii) criteria set out in the headnote to the GATT Article XX, (iii) grant of waiver
does not prejudice WTO Members’ rights and obligations under the DSU, even if they are
not Parties to the MEA in question and (iv) least inconsistent with WTO provisions).  The
waiver would be automatically renewed in case no new developments affect the exceptional
circumstances which led to the granting of the waiver earlier.
Japan, on the other hand, proposed developing non-binding interpretative guidelines
on application of WTO provisions for trade measures pursuant to MEAs, which reflect wide
consensus and address transboundary/ global environmental problems.  The trade measures62
also  needed  to  incorporate  certain  characteristics  including  necessity  (to  achieve  the
environmental  goal),  effectiveness  (trade  measures  are  effective  to  achieve  the
environmental goal, and alternative measures are ineffective) and proportionality.
39
India  maintained  that  the  existing  provisions  of  GATT 1994  provide  sufficient
scope for Members to apply trade measures pursuant to legitimate environmental objectives
contained in existing MEAs and that trade measures pursuant to future MEAs should be
formulated keeping in mind the provisions of the multilateral trading system (WTO 1996a).
Moreover, in case trade measures are restrictive in nature in MEAs, they must respect the
rule-based  nature  of  the  multilateral  trading  system  and  their  costs  in  terms  of  trade
restriction must be fully taken into account.  To ensure the principle of non-discrimination,
the trade measure for environmental protection should be within the scope of Article XX of
GATT 1994.
Considering  the  issue  of  consistency  between  trade  measures  in  MEAs  and
GATT/WTO rules, India noted that a priori trade measures incorporated in MEAs may not
successfully  pass  the  tests  of  necessity,  effectiveness,  least  trade  distortive  and
proportionality.  Hence, the focus in the CTE should not be to encourage dependence on
such trade measures.  India reiterated that MEAs, by and large, should provide for functions
to support implementation towards the environmental objective through capacity building
                                                
39  Japan  proposed  an  increase  in  the  cooperation  between  the  WTO  and  MEAs,  by  inviting  MEA
representatives  into  the  CTE  for  interaction.    Similarly  Korea  suggested  enhanced  dialogue  and
cooperation between MEAs and WTO from the stage of negotiation  to  implementation  of  an  MEA.
Switzerland proposed a more formal process of information exchange and cooperation between the WTO
and MEA Secretariats, where the WTO examine all envisaged trade provisions of a MEA and report back
to the MEAs.63
and  resource  transfer  (including  technological  assistance)
  40,  and  trade  measures  are
provided for only in a handful of MEAs to encourage enforcement.
The United States too stated that there is already a broad scope provided by the
existing WTO rules for Members to take measures for environmental protection, including
those pursuant to MEAs.  In the general framework on this issue, the US suggested that
when  negotiating  trade  measures  in  MEAs  (that  apply  between  parties),  governments
should consider how the intended use of these measures relate to the multilateral trading
system.
IV.2  State of Current Negotiations under DMD Para 31 (i)
Following  the  submissions  and  discussions  on  the  issue  in  the  CTE  prior  to
November  2001,  at  the  Doha  Ministerial,  Members  committed  to  negotiate  on  the
relationship between specific trade obligations under MEAs and WTO rules (Paragraph 31
i, DMD).  Till date fifteen WTO Members, including nine developed and six developing
countries  have  made  formal  submissions:  Argentina,  Australia,  Canada,  China,  Chinese
Taipei, European Community, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and United States. Several Members have made multiple submissions
including Switzerland (4), Japan (2), EC (2), Chinese Taipei (2), and Hong Kong (2).
41
The negotiations so far have been structured by the exact wording of the negotiation
item in paragraph 31 (i), namely that the relationship to be clarified is between “existing”
                                                
40  Indeed, an UNCTAD study (2000) argues that the major reason for India to accede to the Montreal
Protocol  was  the  expectation  that  sufficient  funds  would  be  made  available  to  facilitate  the  use  of
alternative technologies in the phase-out process and in the production of CFC-substitutes.  The study
indicates that the trade effects of the consumption and production quotas do not seem to have affected the
efficiency  of  the  phase-out  schemes.    The  effectiveness  in  the  phase-out  of  aerosols  and  foams  is
attributed  largely  to  the  easy  availability  of  substitute  technologies  and  products  at  good  prices.
However, in certain sectors like refrigeration and air-conditioning, production of CFC-substitutes (like
HFC 134a) faced problems in technology transfer.  While resource dependence should not be a motive for
being party to a MEA, such provisions can help developing, particularly the least developing countries, to
support  international  environmental  initiatives  when  the  expected  burden  of  compliance  for  such
countries is relatively high.
41  One observer country namely Saudi Arabia has also made a formal submission.64
WTO rules and “specific trade obligations” (STOs) set out in the multilateral environmental
regulations, the scope being limited to “parties” (to the MEA in question).  Some Members
have also emphasized that the negotiations are not to “prejudice the WTO rights of any
Member that is not a Party to the MEA in question”.
The  Members  considered  several  options  to  clarify  the  relationship  between  the
rules and provisions of the WTO system and those of MEAs, and these can be classified
into three categories (WTO 2002).  First, status quo, where the issue could be left to be
settled by the dispute settlement mechanism (as and when environmental trade disputes
arise) and allow a legal system, Dispute Settlement Board, to decide the relationship when
an environmental trade dispute arises between WTO Members.
42  Second, Article XX of
GATT  1994  could  be  amended,  i.e.  a  legislative  change  after  reviewing  of  the  GATT
Article XX.  Third, an interpretative decision could be adopted regarding trade measures in
MEAs and WTO rules.
The option of status quo dependent on the WTO Dispute Settlement makes for an
unpredictable future.  Moreover given the trend in unilateralism in the use of restrictive
trade  measures  on  environmental  purposes  and  wider  interpretation  of  Article  XX
exceptions in the disputes of the recent past, it puts multilateralism at risk. The second
option of a legislative amendment has not appealed to the Members since it is a major
change  to  accommodate  a  set  of  exceptional  trade  measures  whose  effectiveness  and
necessity is still questionable.  Thus current negotiations seem to be heading towards the
option of an interpretative decision.
The negotiations so far have distinguished the process, principle and outcome of the
decision on the relationship between STOs in MEAs with the multilateral trade rules of the
                                                
42  Article 13 and Appendix 4 of the DSU allow a panel to seek information and technical advice from any
individual or body which it deems appropriate, to seek information  from any relevant  source and to
consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter, and to request a report in writing
from an advisory review group with respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical
matter raised by a party to a dispute.  This facility is available to panels examining disputes that arise over
the use of any environment-related trade measures, whether these have been applied pursuant to an MEA
or not.  WTO (1996): paragraph 39.65
GATT/WTO as well as the definitions of MEAs and STOs.  Members have also identified
STOs  in  selected  MEAs  that  have  featured  in  earlier  discussions.  Section  4.2.1  briefly
describes the positions of the Members on each of these aspects, and section 4.2.2 gives a
brief analysis of the submissions.
IV.2.1  Submissions under DMD Para 31 (i)
The submissions by the WTO Members have distinguished the different steps in the
negotiations, including procedure to be followed, definition of MEA and STO, relationship
between current WTO rules and STOs, Party vs non-Party issue, and also the expected
outcome of the negotiations.  While not all Members have elaborated on each of these
subheadings, the discussion below considers the submissions under these sub-headings and
highlights the some proposals which have commented on that aspect.
IV.2.1.1 The procedure
A well-defined step by step approach to the negotiations was proposed by Australia
in June 2002.  First, Members could identify “specific trade obligations” in MEAs (from
those listed in the Secretariat Note, WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.1), and then identify any relevant
WTO rules that have to be considered in relation to any action that might be taken by WTO
Members  pursuant  to  each  obligation.    The  second  phase  would  include  information
exchange with MEA secretariats and experience-sharing among WTO Members, especially
to determine whether there have been particular implementation issues with these “specific
trade obligations”.  The third and final phase would consider the work under the first two
phases and discuss the way forward.
This three-phased approach was supported by several Members, including Brazil,
Chinese  Taipei,  China,  Canada,  Chile,  Cuba,  Egypt,  Indonesia,  India,  Korea,  Malaysia,
Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, and Singapore among others in 2002.
43  Switzerland, however,
opposed the Australian step-by-step proposal, suggesting that the CTE Special Sessions
                                                
43  Summary Report on CTESS, TN/TE/R/2 (dated 25
th July 2002): page 11.66
could conduct parallel examination of the “principles governing the relationship between
the  WTO  rules  and  MEAs”  (emphasis  added).    The  EC  too  is  keen  on  clarifying  the
principles in the relationship rather than such a structured approach which would limit the
scope.
In  October-November  2002,  Members  agreed  to  examine  the  STOs  in  certain
MEAs,  and  complement  the  review  with  a  conceptual  analysis.    In  particular,  the  US
proposed six MEAs (namely the CITES, Montreal Protocol, Basel Convention, Cartagena
Protocol,  Rotterdam  Convention  on  PIC  and  the  Stockholm  Convention  on  POPs)  that
could be examined, and this gained support from several Members.  Indeed, Australia stated
that the six MEAs identified by the US were likely to be the only agreements to contain
STOs.  All other agreements were either (1) not multilateral, (2) did not have environmental
protection as their main objective, or (3) did not contain STOs.
 44  Argentina, Brazil, Hong
Kong China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines and Thailand
support examining the trade obligations in different MEAs in a systematic way.
45
It is useful to note here that a structured approach has the advantage of allowing
Members to understand and examine trade measures within MEAs and the provisions of the
GATT/WTO system completely before interpreting a relationship between the two distinct
regimes.  After all, both the systems (the MEAs and the WTO) are dynamic and evolving
continuously  over  time  and  a  step-by-step  approach  examining  selected  MEAs  is  a
judicious choice before establishing a relationship between the two.
IV.2.1.2 Definition of MEA
The EC defined an MEA as a legally binding instrument between  at least three
parties, negotiated under the  aegis of the UN, in which the main aim is to protect the
environment and which is open to all countries concerned from the moment negotiations
begin.  In the context of the WTO, an MEA should also be relevant to the aims set out in
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sub-paragraphs (b) or (g) and the headnote of GATT Article XX. .  The MEA should be
open  to  all  WTO  Members  for  accession.    Moreover,  regional  agreements  should  be
included provided it is open to all countries in the region for negotiation and accession, and
“open”  to  any  countries  outside  the  region  whose  interests  may  be  affected  by  the
agreement.
Japan too proposed a wide definition, where the environmental agreement is open to
any country sharing the environmental objective, and the agreement has been developed
and  agreed  “taking  into  account  works  including  those  under  the  aegis  of  the  United
Nations or its specialized agencies and with the participation of a substantial number of the
countries”. Besides MEAs in force, for practical reasons, Japan states, that it would be
necessary to include in the discussion MEAs which have already been signed and adopted
in due course but yet entered into force.
As opposed to the wide scope proposed by the EC and Japan, Argentina defined the
scope of the negotiations to cover only those MEAs that are currently in force.  India too
has supported this interpretation of MEA in the mandate of negotiations, as including only
“an MEA that has entered into force”.  Moreover, the MEA should have been negotiated
and signed under the aegis of the United Nations, its specialized agencies like the UNEP,
have attained a certain degree of universality and are open.
The Indian proposal also added an explicit condition that the MEA should have
“effective participation in the negotiations by countries belonging to different geographical
regions and by countries at different stages of economic and social development” (similar
to the condition in New Zealand’s proposal on item i in February 1996).  Malaysia endorsed
the Argentinean and Indian definition in its submission, and explicitly added that regional
agreements do not fall in the purview of the Doha mandate.  Similarly, China has defined
characteristics of a MEA as covering an agreement negotiated under the auspices of the
UN, universal, open for accession by relevant parties, with explicit trade measures that
exert a substantial “impact on trade”, and currently in force.68
It is interesting to note here that China explicitly defined the universality of a MEA
to  mean  “substantial  number  of  contracting  parties  account  for  a  majority  of  WTO
Members”.  This condition is possibly to take care of multilateralism in its true sense (the
principle voiced by EC), and to ensure that only MEAs that can be strongly associated with
international trade are included.
46
Considering  the  definitions  proposed  so  far  by  the  Members,  the  aspects  of
universality and meaningful participation by countries representing different geographical
regions and stages of development are important to ensure that the scope of the negotiations
are only environmental treaties that are truly multilateral in nature.  The MEAs should be
concerned with truly global environmental problems, and not regional or national issues. In
this respect, negotiations need not be restricted to only MEAs in force and but also include
those to come into force in the near future (e.g the Stockholm Convention on POPs, which
is likely to come into force by mid-2004).
IV.2.1.3 Definition of Specific Trade Obligation
The  EC’s  definition  of  STOs  was  just  as  broad  as  its  definition  of  MEAs.    In
particular  the  EC  classified  trade  measures  in  MEAs  as  those  which  are  (i)  explicitly
provided for and mandatory under MEAs;(ii) not explicitly provided for nor mandatory
under the MEA itself but consequential of the “obligation de résultat” of the MEA; (iii) not
identified in the MEA which has only an “obligation de résultat” but that Parties could
decide to implement in order to comply with their obligations (iv) not required in the MEA
but which Parties can decide to implement if the MEA contains a general provision stating
that parties can adopt stringent measures in accordance with international law.  While to
several WTO Members only the first type of measure appear to fit the Doha mandate, the
EC called for a detailed analysis in order to determine where any cut-off point (or points)
between “ specific” and “ non-specific” trade obligations exist.  Moreover, in its second
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submission,
47 the EC defined “set out in MEAs” should not be interpreted as being limited
to the treaty itself, as originally adopted, but should also cover all subsequent decisions by
the Conference of the Parties (COP), provided that they qualify as STOs.
The  Japanese  submission  reiterated  the  EC  classification  of  trade  measures,  and
indicated that the first category of measures (explicit and mandatory) could be deemed as
STOs compatible with WTO rules among MEA Parties, while those in the second category
(obligation de résultat) could be “rebuttably presumed” to be the STOs consistent with
WTO rules, if the measures are based on scientific principles and are proportional to the
scope/ range of the MEA.  The trade measures in the last two categories are to be decided
on a case-by-case basis.
Switzerland also endorsed the EC proposal on the four categories of trade measures
and added that STOs can be classified under two headings: (1) trade measures that are
explicitly  provided  for  and  mandatory  under  MEAs;  and  (2)  other  measures  that  are
relevant and necessary to achieve an MEA objective.  I.e. the Swiss definition of STOs
includes all trade measures under the first three categories of trade measures outlined by EC
and Japan.
The other WTO Members, in particular, Argentina, China, India, Korea, Malaysia,
Taipei and US proposed a more limited approach to identifying STOs.  These proposals
indicate that only explicitly identified as mandatory (“specific”) export/import operations
that  are  legally  enforceable  (obligation)  within  the  framework  of  an  MEA  should  be
considered to be STOs.  China added that the MEA trade measures should be relevant (i.e.
related  to  WTO  disciplines)  with  the  objective  of  protecting  the  environment/  natural
resources in order to be STOs.
Several Member submissions have identified the STOs in selected MEAs.  Based on
the  country  definition  adopted,  the  identified  STOs  for  a  particular  MEA  are  different
across the Member submissions.  In particular, the EC has not identified any specific trade
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obligation  measure  within  the  MEAs  except  to  indicate  that  trade  measures  are  key
instruments  in  the  CITES,  Basel  and  Rotterdam  Conventions,  while  the  Montreal,
Cartagena  and  Stockholm  agreements  contain  STOs.    Similarly,  Switzerland  has  only
indicated that the CITES, Basel, Cartagena and Stockholm Conventions contain explicit
obligatory  trade  measures  (1
st  category  of  STOs),  while  the  Montreal  Protocol  and
Rotterdam  Convention  contain  trade  measures  relevant  and  necessary  to  achieve  the
environmental objectives (2
nd category of STOs).  Following the same line of reasoning,
Norway’s submission did not list the set of STOs within the six MEAs, but pointed out that
there is “grey area” in identification of trade obligations and a clear demarcation of STOs
versus trade measures falling outside the negotiation mandate is not possible.
On the other hand, while Japan has supported EC’s broader mandate, the official
submission has followed the MEA review procedure.  The Japanese submission provided
the analysis of three MEAs as an illustration, however the classification of STOs seem
wider than those of by other country submissions like China, India, Korea, Malaysia, or US.
For  example,  Article  7  in  the  Basel  Convention  banning  transboundary  movement  of
hazardous wastes through states which are non-Party has been classified as an STO by
Japan but not by the others since it is outside the mandate of the current negotiations.
In the submissions by China, India, Korea, Malaysia and US, the STOs identified in
the MEAs by each Members do not match.  Consider the case of the Basel Convention: The
obligation under Article 4.1(a), which states that “Parties exercising their right to prohibit
the import of hazardous wastes or other wastes for disposal shall inform the other Parties of
their decision pursuant to Article 13” is not considered to be an STO by China, India,
Malaysia and Korea.  The provision to decide has been considered to be a right of the Party
and the obligation to inform others of its decision follows only after the right has been
exercised.  This fine distinction between a specific trade obligation versus a trade obligation
following the exercising of the Party’s right is arguable.  The US, however, has included
obligations like Article 4.1(a) and 4.2(f) (f. requires that “information about a proposed
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes be provided to the States
concerned”) as STOs, since it involves information directly related to trade.71
Similarly, the trade obligation under Article 4.7.b of the Basel Convention, which
covers packaging and labeling of hazardous wastes, has not be considered to be a STO by
India,  Malaysia,  but  included  by  the  US  (while  China  and  Korea  have  excluded  4.7
completely).    The  provisions  in  Article  6.1-6.3  cover  the  prior  information  consent
procedure and have been listed as STOs by China, Korea, Malaysia, and the US, but India
has excluded Article 6.2 since it involves the right of the importing country to consent or
refuse trade.  However, Article 8, which lays down the exporting Party’s obligation to re-
import hazardous wastes in case the trade is incomplete, has been classified as an STO by
the US, as a trade obligation by  India  (but  not  by  China,  Korea  and  Malaysia)  on  the
grounds that it is not specific. Finally, the US has classified provisions on transmission of
information contained in Article 13.2, 13.3.a and 13.4 as STOs, while China, India, Korea
and Malaysia have excluded these.
48  Indeed, the US identification of STOs pursuant to the
Basel  Convention  corresponds  closely  to  the  Japanese  submission  with  regard  to
transmission of information. The Table 4 below lists the STOs corresponding to the six
MEAs from selected country submissions.
The  above  example  of  STOs  identified  within  the  Basel  Convention  by  various
Members illustrate that there are indeed grey areas based on the language of the provisions.
As rightly pointed out by Canada (WTO 2003i), it is relatively easy to identify a provision
as  an  STO  if  it  affects  traditional  areas  of  trade  law  i.e.  import  and  export  bans  and
restrictions on trade, but an STO may also include  provisions  that  affect  trade  such  as
notifications, technical regulations, packaging and labelling requirements all of which are
subject to WTO rules (e.g. Article 4.7 (b) Basel Convention).  It is also difficult to classify
when an STO does not become an obligation of one Party until another Party has asserted a
right or privilege (Article 4.1 (a), (b) & (c) of the Basel Convention).  Another complexity
arises  due  to  the  discretion  contained  in  a  provision  as  in  Article  4.2  (e)  of  the  Basel
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Convention, which requires Parties to take appropriate measures to not allow the export of
hazardous wastes to a country "if it has reason to believe that the wastes in question will not
be managed in an environmentally sound manner, according to criteria to be decided by the
Parties at their first meeting".  Thus a core component in the identification of STOs seems
to be the level of discretion left to a Party in the choice of a range of measures, and the
implementation and the design of a measure.  The Canadian paper further suggested that
Members  should  consider  whether  provisions  in  MEAs  which  permit  considerable
discretion  should  have  the  same  relationship  to  WTO  rules  as  those  with  little  or  no
discretion.  This is a useful principle for the current negotiations.
The aspect brought forward by Canada and Japan on defining a STO, highlight the
fact  that  greater  the  discretion  provided  in  MEAs  greater  the  difficulty  to  establish  a
relationship with WTO rules.  In case the EC definition of STOs is adopted (where non-
specific, non-mandatory trade provisions or obligation de résultat are admitted), there is a
perceptible risk of protectionist trade measures being used by WTO Members  as STOs
under MEAs.  To avoid such protectionist pitfalls, a more restrictive definition is advisable.
In  this  respect,  it  may  be  prudent  to  classify  STOs  on  a  case-by-case  basis  for  MEAs
providing considerable discretion.73
Table 4:  STOs Identified in Six MEAs in Country Submissions (Entries indicate the articles of the concerned MEA)
WTO Member CITES Basel Convention Montreal Protocol Cartagena Protocol Rotterdam Conv. Stockholm Conv.
China III, IV, V, VI 4.1.b, 4.1.c, 4.2.e, 4.5,
4.6, 6 are STOs
4 (a, b, c) - - -
EC Trade measures key
instruments in this MEA
Trade measures key to
achieve goals of MEA.
Trade obligations in











and export of certain
POPs.
India III.2, III.3, III.4; IV.2,
IV.4, IV.5, IV.6, IV.7;
V.2, V.3, V.4; VI are
trade obligations
(XIV not STO)
4.1.b, 4.1.c are STOs
4.2e, 4.6, 4.7c, 6.1, 6.3,




7.1, 8.1, 11, 18.2 b, c
are trade obligations.
2.4, 10.3, 10.6, 12.1,
13, 14.1, 26.1 are rights
of a Party.
16 is not STO
10.9, 11.2, 12 are
trade obligations.




3.1, 3.2 are trade
obligations.
4, 8 are rights.
Japan III, IV, V, VI are STOs.
VIII.1 obligation de
resultat.
4.1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13 are
STOs
2A to 2H obligation
de resultat
- - -
Korea III; IV; V; VI
(VIII, XIV not STO)
4.1 b & c, 4.5, 4.6, 6 are
STOs
(4.1 not STO; 4.2e
ambiguous, 8 not clear)
4 is STO 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.1, 11.2,
15 are STOs.
2.4, 11.4, 11.8, 13, 14,
16, 26 are not STOs. 18
is unclear.
5.1, 5.2, 6, 7, 8, 10.4,
10.9, 11.2, 12.1, 13.2
are STOs.
9, 13.3, 15.4 are not
STOs.
3.1, 3.2 are STOs.
4, 8 are not STOs.
Malaysia III.2, III.3, III.4, III.5;
IV.2, IV.4, IV.5, IV.6,
V.2, V.3, V.4, VI.2,
VI.3, VI.4 VI.5, VI.6,
VIII.6
4.1b, 4.1c (via Article
13), 4.6, 4.7c, 6.1, 6.2,
6.3
4A, 4B - - -
Switzerland 1
st category of STO 1
st category of STO 2
nd category of STO 1
st category of STO 2
nd category of STO 1
st category of STO
US II.4, III, IV.1, IV.2,
IV.3, IV.4, IV.5, IV.6;
V; VI.1, VI.2, VI.3,
VI.4, VI.5, VI.6; VIII.1a
& b, VIII.3, VIII.4,
VIII.6, VIII.7; IX are
STOs.
3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2e f g;
4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10,
5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4,
6.5, 6.9, 6.10, 8, 9.2,
13.2, 13.3a, 13.4 are
STOs. Not 4.5 (against
non-Party).
4A(1) is STO





7.1, 7.3, 8, 9.1, 9.2,
10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4,
18.2, 19 are STOs.
16 not STO (not
specific, Party has
discretion).
5.1, 5.2, 10.2, 10.4,
10.5, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9,
11, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3,
12.4, 13.2, 13.4 are
STOs.
13.3 not STO (Party
has discretion).
3.1a (ii), 3.2 a, b (i),
(ii); 3.2 c; Annex A
Part II para c (among
parties) are STOs.
Source: Compiled from information in WTO (2003a), WTO (2003e), WTO (2003g) and WTO (2003h).74
IV.2.1.4 Relationship Between Existing WTO rules and STOs
According  to  the  EC,  the  foremost  demandeur  of  the  current  environmental
negotiation agenda, the MEAs and WTO as equal bodies of international law, and that the
WTO  rules  are  not  to  be  considered  in  “clinical  isolation”  (an  approach  already
corroborated  by  the  WTO  Appellate  Body  in  a  dispute).      The  clarification  of  the
relationship between MEAs and WTO, according to the EC should be a result of political
consensus and not left to the dispute settlement process of the WTO.  The clarification of
the relationship would “render multilateralism de facto more attractive than unilateralism”,
and  help  in  the  interpretation  of  WTO  law  in  dispute  involving  non-Parties.    The  EC
position has strong support from Switzerland, who has indicated a foregone compatibility/
consistency  between  trade  obligations  under  MEAs  and  the  WTO  trading  system.
Switzerland has reiterated that trade measures under MEAs should be considered under the
principles of “no hierarchy”, “mutual supportiveness” and “deference” in relation to the
WTO rules.  The Swiss proposal has gone further to a principle of “reversal of the burden
of proof” under the principle of presumption of conformity, which implies that a WTO
Member  no  longer  needs  to  show  that  its  trade  restrictive  measure  was  covered  under
Article XX (b).
The US, on the other hand, while not opposed to the current negotiations, maintains
that the MEA/WTO relationship has worked “quite well”, and observed that WTO rules
have not had a “stifling effect on MEA negotiators’ willingness to include trade obligations
in MEAs”.  However, the US noted that the clarification of the relationship between WTO
rules and MEA is critically important for “enhanced domestic coordination between MEA
and WTO policy makers and negotiators”.  In this regard, agenda item 31(ii) of the DMD
on  enhanced  communication  and  cooperation  between  MEAs  and  WTO  is  valuable  to
promote “coordination between environment and trade officials at national levels”.  Thus
while the EC and Switzerland (with support from Japan and Norway) seek multilateral
consensus to override WTO rules with STOs under MEAs, the US views the relationship to
enhance coordination of WTO rules with its domestic policies!75
The  other  WTO  Members  including  Argentina,  Chinese  Taipei  and  India,  have
emphasized on the need to ensure that STOs in MEAs are consistent with the WTO rules.
Thus to these countries the clarification of the relationship between STOs in MEAs and
WTO rules would improve the policy coherence between trade and environment, and the
rights and obligations of the WTO Members would be protected through the clarification.
IV.2.1.5 Party and non-Party Issues
The Party versus non-Party issue is divided among the trade giants, namely the EC
and the US.  Understandably, the US clearly stated that the STOs considered in the mandate
are those that apply among Parties, and not obligations that require Parties to take particular
trade action in relation to non-Parties (considering the US is a non-Party to four of the six
MEAs  under  consideration).    The  EC,  on  the  other  hand,  noted  that  although  the
discussions are “currently only considering the applicability of WTO rules as among Parties
to MEAs (it) does not mean that MEAs should not be an important element of interpretation
of WTO law in disputes involving non-Parties”.  Among those supportive of the broader
agenda of EC, Norway agreed to restrict the current negotiation mandate “among Parties”
to  the  MEA  in  question,  but  Switzerland  indicated  that  the  phrase  “among  Parties”  is
unclear since Parties to an original convention may not ratify subsequent amendments.
Close to the US position, Argentina strongly indicated that the rights of a WTO
Member should not be prejudiced in case the Member is not a Party to a MEA, especially
considering the fact that some MEAs contain a clause, which protects rights and obligations
under other international agreements (for example, the Marrakesh Agreement).  Similarly,
the Chinese Taipei submission states that the current negotiations should not prejudice the
WTO rights of any Member not Party to the MEA in question.
Considering  the  issue  of  a  potential  dispute  among  WTO  Members  over  trade
measures pursuant to a MEA, the EC stated that a potential conflict among parties to an
MEA is unlikely, since the STOs in MEAs are negotiated by consensus.  In case of such a
dispute between Parties brought to the WTO for resolution, the EC suggested that the panel76
should take “due account” of the MEA and consider the trade measures under the MEA as
“legitimate”.  According to the EC, since the WTO and MEAs have “equal status”, the
resolution of a dispute should consider which of the two sets of rules (WTO vs MEA)
“provides for a more specific regulation of the issue under dispute” (WTO 2002a: page 7)!
This suggestion is far-reaching, since even without a change in the legislative provisions of
the GATT/WTO, the EC submission proposes that in a WTO resolution of Party-Party
dispute  the  MEA  rules  may  override  any  non-specific  WTO  rule  on  that  matter  (the
principle of lex specialis generali derogat or more specialized law replaces the general,
even though the MEA and WTO are distinct specialized legal documents).  It is important
to note here, that according to the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention
(which has been used extensively by the Appellate Bodies in the WTO disputes, as seen in
section 2.3 and 2.4 before) account has to be taken of “any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” or
“any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of
the parties regarding its interpretation” (Article 31.3 a, b).  Thus if a subsequent practice
allows  for  MEA  provisions  to  override  WTO  rules,  then  it  would  be  deemed  as  the
interpretation of environmental provisions in international law.
As opposed to the EC position on potential disputes between WTO Members-Parties to a
MEA, Taipei has proposed that the complaining Member alone should have the right to
bring the case to the dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO regime or the regime of
the MEA in question (WTO 2002c: para 9).  In case of a dispute between WTO Member/
non-Party and a WTO Member/Party to a MEA, the WTO panel should (if applicable) give
weight to the fact that the WTO Member/non-Party to the MEA in question was precluded
from participation in the negotiations of such a MEA.
IV.2.1.6 Outcome of the Negotiations
Although the WTO Members are progressing towards an interpretative decision on
the relationship between STOs in MEAs and the WTO rules, the expectations from the
outcome of the negotiations are different among the Members.  On the one hand, some
Members,  most  prominently  Argentina  and  Australia,  have  reiterated  that  this  decision77
should not disturb the rights under the WTO, and on the other hand, Members including the
EC, Norway, Switzerland and Japan are driving a much broader agenda.
According  to  Switzerland,  in  particular,  the  interpretative  decision  on  the
relationship between the trade and the environment protection systems would serve two
objectives:  first,  it  would  “clarify  the  scope  of  WTO  law”  that  would  be  useful  in
negotiating  the  development  of  trade  rules  in  MEAs;  and  second,  it  would  provide
“guidance  for  the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  Board”.    Switzerland  has  emphasized  the
principles of no hierarchy, mutual supportiveness, deference, and consistency between the
two international systems of law, namely the WTO and MEAs.  This stand endorses the EC
position that WTO and MEA are to be accorded “equal status”.  Norway and Japan have
also argued on the lines of presumed consistency between the trade measures in MEAs and
the WTO rules.  For this set of Members, the present negotiations are meant to reaffirm the
mutual supportiveness of the two systems of law.
The  majority  of  the  Members  does  not  support  such  a  radical  objective  of  the
current negotiations and have adopted a more restrictive position to draw up STOs pursuant
to MEAs which are consistent with the WTO provisions.
IV.2.2  Analysis of the submissions
The submissions by the respective Members reflect the positions they adopted in the
initial discussions on CTE item (i) on the relationship between trade measures pursuant to
MEAs and WTO rules.  The submissions can be divided into two distinct sets, one that
represents  the  more  radical  change  to  accommodate  trade  measures  (where  the  terms
specific and obligation are determined) within MEAs in the WTO system; and the other
which  is  more  restrictive  in  nature  trying  to  ensure  consistency  of  only  specific  trade
obligations within MEAs with the multilateral trading system, without disturbing Member
rights.  The  first set of submissions  has  come  from  the  EC,  Norway,  and  Switzerland.
While the second set of submissions following a more restrictive review of MEAs come
from  Members  including  Argentina,  Australia,  Canada,  China,  Chinese  Taipei,  India,78
Malaysia, and United States.  These Members are trying to structure the negotiations to
ensure that the scope is limited to the mandate agreed at Doha.  Japan, although supportive
of the EC, has submitted a structured analysis of MEAs adopted by the latter group of
Members who have a more restrictive approach.
The negotiation stance of the EC, the principal demandeur of the Paragraph 31 (i) of
DMD, as well as that of Switzerland and Norway, is to push for a broad scope legitimizing
trade measures based on cooperative environmental initiatives (taken among at least three
parties).  The official stand is that the decision would clarify the environment for  “trade
policy makers and negotiators of MEAs alike and help prevent conflicts from happening in
the first place because clearer parameters would mean that MEAs would take WTO rules
into account and WTO law would give due weight to obligations arising under MEAs”
(WTO 2002a, paragraph 15).  The objective of the negotiations is to make STOs under
MEAs  “more  secure  than  similar  measures  taken  unilaterally  and  without  any  form  of
international frame of reference, endorsement or debate” (ibid paragraph 16).  In particular,
the EC states that this would boost multilateralism as opposed to unilateralism.  Thus the
submissions by EC, Norway and Switzerland has refrained from doing an MEA-by-MEA
analysis of STOs, and instead commented on the conceptual relationship of two equal legal
systems, namely the MEAs and the WTO.
While the objective of the radical set of submissions is well-founded, the restrictive
structured  analysis  of  STOs  in  the  submissions  of  the  second  set  of  Members  can  be
appreciated  too.    In  particular,  the  resistance  to  the  broad  conceptual  decision  by  the
developing country Members like Argentina, Chinese Taipei, China, Hong Kong, India, and
Malaysia stem from the perceived threat of an increase in protectionism on environmental
grounds.  Since the existing environmental provisions in the WTO have allowed a Member
to invoke restrictive trade measures unilaterally in the recent past, the apprehensions are
that a decision on STOs pursuant to MEAs would enhance restrictions on legitimate trade
restriction on a regional basis. The developing countries have been known to be supportive
of  international  environmental  treaties  (see  Table  2  on  the  ratification  status  of  the  six
MEAs by China, India and Malaysia) more than some developed countries (like the US),79
which illustrates their cognizance and commitment to environmental protection.  Moreover,
the developing countries view the WTO system as a means of ensuring fair gainful trade to
promote sustainable economic development, which might be hampered in case the trading
regime is complicated with rules from another regime namely that of the MEAs
The submissions of Australia, Canada and the US, too fall in the category of the
more restrictive negotiation stand, although their stakes are quite different from that of the
developing  countries.    The  submissions  follow  the  same  MEA-review  analysis,  but  the
negotiation position is different.  These developed countries’ position seems to come more
as an opposition to EC’s policies (for example high farm subsidies and import restrictions
on genetically modified food), which have constrained for instance food exports from the
US (as evident from the EC-hormone disputes).
Both the EC and the US have been trying to promote the “environment” in the WTO
system  in  their  own  ways,  the  former  through  the  negotiation  for  a  new  WTO  rule
recognizing  trade  measures  in  MEAs,  and  the  latter  through  the  unilateral  use  trade
restrictions justifiable under existing WTO rules.  The environmental priorities of the US
and the EC are distinct, and the difference is being reflected in the current negotiations
stands at the WTO.  Thus the position of developing countries in the current negotiations is
quite distinct from the US, even though both favour a structured and restrictive agenda.
V  Indian strategy in the Negotiations and the Way Forward
India had long maintained a position that the existing WTO rules provide are “more
than  adequate  to  deal  with  trade  measures  taken  for  achieving  genuine  environmental
goals”  and  it  is  neither  necessary  nor  desirable  to  exceed  that  scope  (WTO  1996a:
paragraph  13).    In  the  current  negotiations  on  DMD  Para  31  (i),  however,  the  Indian
submission  has  followed  the  MEA-by-MEA  review  to  analyze  STOs  to  arrive  at  the
interpretative decision.  In particular, the MEAs under consideration should include only
those negotiated under the aegis of the UN and/or specialized agencies, whose negotiations
included effective participation from countries belonging to different geographical regions80
and by countries at different stages of economic and social development (WTO 2003f).
India has also indicated that specific trade obligations identified under the MEAs should
satisfy each of the terms, namely they should be mandatory and specific obligations (not
obligation de resultat).
India’s pre-Doha stand on status quo has changed to the MEA-by-MEA analysis to
accommodate  STOs  in  the  WTO  system.      While  the  current  negotiation  stand  seems
restrictive,  it  is  part  of  the  softer  option  to  accommodate  trade  obligations  pursuant  to
MEAs within the WTO rules without disturbing Member rights.
In the meetings of the CTE Special Sessions in 2003, most of the Members have
supported the negotiation based on the MEA-by-MEA analysis of STOs (also called the
bottom-up approach).  The discussions have also brought into focus whether COP decisions
of MEAs should be considered within the formal definition of MEA (favoured by the EC).
Members from the more restrictive group, including Australia and Malaysia favour limiting
the provisions to those contained in the body of the agreements, and in their protocols or
annexes,  rather  than  all  COP  decisions.    Members  have  also  questioned  the  presumed
consistency and the radical Swiss principle of reversal of burden of proof under GATT
Article XX.  Most prominently  Argentina,  Australia  and  Brazil  have  noted  that  such  a
principle constitutes a fundamental change in the balance of rights and obligations, and is
not a mere procedural change.  Recently, the US also called upon the demandeurs to engage
in  experience  sharing,  indicating  that  there  is  a  need  to  share  “STO  negotiation  and
implementation experiences” under MEAs as the way forward in the negotiations.
49  The
recent  negotiations  indicate  the  MEA-by-MEA  analysis  is  moving  toward  information
sharing before an interpretative decision is finally made.
The  clarification  sought  by  the  current  negotiations  on  the  relationship  between
STOs pursuant to MEAs and WTO rules is bound to be complicated since they represent
two distinct regimes.  There cannot be hierarchy in the ranking of the MEAs and the WTO
since they pertain to completely different sets of rules for two distinct matters of concern.
                                                
49  Summary Report on the 6
th Meeting of the CTE Special Sessions, (TN/TE/R/6), 12 June 200381
After  all,  as  the  ASEAN  pre-Doha  proposal  had  noted,  the  WTO  is  the  “lex  specialis
derogate generali” i.e. the more specialized treaty on trade than any other treaty, and by the
same token the MEAs will remain the specialized fora to solve environmental problems.
The question of MEAs and WTO being “equal” legal bodies, as the EC has proposed, does
not  seem  appropriate  since  the  two  distinct  and  dissimilar  regimes  cannot  be  ranked.
However, one regime can in principle recognize some rules of another regime (and vice
versa) and the two regimes can be supportive of each other.
The softer option in the current negotiations allows India to oppose the recent trend
in unilateralism (and imposing domestic environmental  rules  extra  jurisdictionally),  and
also  steer  clear  of  the  more  radical  approach  of  presumed  consistency,  precautionary
principle based on lack of scientific evidence and reversal of burden of proof (fundamental
move  away  from  the  science  and  rule  based  GATT/WTO  system).    While  the  radical
approach of the EC is in support of “multilateralism”, it contains risks of protectionism and
national  discretion.    As  noted  earlier,  provisions  within  some  MEAs  allow  for  Party
discretion or environmental priority in the use of restrictive trade practices among Parties
(e.g. Article 11.8 of the Cartagena Protocol to ban trade in LMOs) even though there may
be  no  scientific  basis  for  such  environmental  measures.    Thus  a  decision/rule  that
completely  accommodates  MEAs  within  the  WTO  system  poses  a  potential  risk  to
multilateralism.
It is pertinent to reiterate at this point that trade obligations pursuant to MEAs may
not  be  effective  or  efficient,  since  they  are  meant  to  work  in  conjunction  with  other
provisions  laid  out  in  the  treaty.    As  noted  in  section  3.2  earlier,  even  specific  trade
obligations considered critical to achieve the environmental objective of the MEA (e.g. the
CITES) have not worked when conducive domestic factors were lacking (e.g. habitat loss
endangering species).  Thus the conditions of necessity, effectiveness and proportionality of
trade measures (submission by Chinese Taipei, and pre-Doha proposals by New Zealand
and  ASEAN)  are  meaningful  and  important  aspects  to  maintain  during  the  current
negotiations for the decision on STOs pursuant to MEAs and WTO rules.  Thus a WTO
decision to support MEAs cannot overlook the fact whether the trade measures pursuant to82
an MEA are indeed  an integral,  crucial  and efficient tool to achieve the  environmental
objective.
India has traditionally supported multilateral efforts to protect the environment as
well as the principle of free and fair trade, and will continue to do so.  The  efforts to
promote sustainable development at home have to be balanced with her gains from trade
under the WTO regime. For instance, India’s environmental interests would be to ensure
concessional  import  of  environment  friendly  technology  and  prevention  of  hazardous
products  that  are  domestically  prohibited  in  industrialized  countries  (the  information
enhancing MEAs are of particular relevance here).
At the same time, India is looking forward to the further opening up of markets for
exports,  particularly  agricultural  and  textile  products,  in  industrialized  countries.    The
interests of other developing countries, like China and Malaysia, are similar to that of India,
and their position in the current negotiations reveal that they too are keen to ensure that
their export prospects are not hurt by the interpretative decision.  Thus a well-structured
analysis of STOs in a MEA-by-MEA, where the MEAs considered are those with majority
WTO Members is the most attractive option at the current negotiations. This would allow
for balancing India’s commercial as well as environmental interests.
Since each MEA is distinct, the case-by-case analysis allows for recognizing the
uniqueness of each treaty and the corresponding STOs.  Although, the STOs identified by
the Members do not necessarily match based on the interpretation of the legal language of a
treaty and the Party discretion contained in the provisions, the exercise is clearly bringing
out the nuances which can help interpret which trade obligations pursuant to an MEA is
necessary and justifiable to achieve the environmental objective.
In this light, the recognition of STOs on a MEA-by-MEA basis in the WTO system
seems the most systematic and thorough approach to clarify the relationship sought under
the current negotiating agenda.  The results from such an analysis can also be used to derive
an understanding to support MEAs within the WTO regime.83
The decision on trade obligations pursuant to MEAs and GATT/WTO rules is long
overdue, since the Members have been deliberating for a decade now.  Moreover, in view
of the increasing significance of the environment in political, social and business agendas
across all major countries (including developing countries), the current negotiations need to
be successful to ensure the multilateral trading system under WTO continues to thrive in the
new century.
VI  Conclusion
The literature on the interface of trade and environment, as well as the evaluation of
trade measures within MEAs indicate that trade restrictions are not the only nor necessarily
the most effective policy instrument to achieve the environmental objective of the MEAs.
The root cause of environmentally unsustainable development is the existence of market or
regulatory failures, when the true value of environmental resources or cost of polluting
economic activities are not reflected in market prices due to structural defects in the system
or due to improper government policies.  Co-operative environmental efforts as reflected by
MEAs remain important to address transboundary and global environmental problems, and
trade measures can play an important role in some of these MEAs.  Indeed, India noted in
an initial paper in 1996 to the CTE that, in dealing with only one element of an MEA,
namely, the trade measure, “we may be unconsciously encouraging dependence on trade
measures to achieve environmental objectives, when we are all agreed that this is not the
best way of handling environmental concerns”.
Given  the  rise  in  environmental  consciousness  and  concerted  efforts  across  the
globe to tackle genuine environmental problems (which defy national jurisdictions) through
MEAs, one cannot disregard trade obligations pursuant to such MEAs within the WTO
especially  when  those  directly  relate  to  certain  trade  rules.    India  has  recognized  the
principle to support environmental initiatives and has been Party to most major MEAs.  At
the same time, India recognizes that gains from fair and free trade are important to support84
sustainable development at home.  The current negotiations on Para 31 (i) of the DMD need
to be successfully arrive at an interpretative decision, since it is long overdue.
Although the present provisions within the GATT/WTO allow for unilateral trade
measures on  environmental  grounds,  a  new  decision  on  the  relationship  between STOs
pursuant to MEAs and rules of the multilateral system is  essential to curb the trend in
unilateralism.  The jurisprudence in a recent environmental-trade dispute ruling indicates
that bilateral good faith efforts to protect the environment can make departure from free
trade  justifiable,  since  the  interpretation  of  the  GATT  Article  XX  provisions  has  been
significantly broadened (e.g. Malaysia-US Compliance Dispute on Shrimp-Turtle 2001).
Given the recognition of autonomy of a WTO Member in determining domestic
environmental regulations (which can  affect trade with  Members),  and  the  widening  of
interpretation of justifiable trade restrictions, the multilateral trading system is at risk of
protectionism.    By  default  any  domestic  environmental  regulation  would  take  into
consideration only its own environmental/ ecological and economic interests, with complete
disregard  to  other  countries.    Yet,  such  local  environmental  considerations  are  neither
ecologically  nor  economically  efficient.    A  WTO  decision  that  supports  specific  trade
obligations pursuant to MEAs (represented by large participation of countries from various
regions and stages of development) is the only way to  restrain unilateral measures that
currently threaten multilateralism.
The EC, the main demander of the environment agenda in the WTO, regards MEAs
and WTO as holding equal legal status, even though the two distinct regimes defy such
ranking.  The broad agenda of the EC (supported by Switzerland and Norway), poses risk to
the  multilateralism  it  claims  to  uphold,  since  some  MEAs  allow  Party  discretion  to
undertake unilateral restrictive trade measures based on the Party’s environmental priorities
or  evaluation.    Thus  the  broad  agenda  of  EC  carries  a  potential  threat  of  regionalism/
unilateralism.85
There is also a risk of protectionism in the definition of individual terms within the
current  negotiations.    While  it  may  seem  that  the  WTO  Members  have  engaged  in
semantics of each term contained in Paragraph 31.1 of the DMD, the final interpretation of
the provisions under the MEAs hinge on these definitions. Even supporters of the broader
agenda, like Japan, have acknowledged that the discretion provided in some MEAs make
the definition of STOs difficult, and indeed a case-by-case analysis may be required for
those MEAs.  In this light, a restrictive definition of STOs as adopted by India is a sound
approach, especially to check for the protectionist pitfalls of a broader definition.
Finally,  a  structured  MEA-by-MEA  analysis  is  a  judicious  negotiating  stand  to
clarify the relationship between of STOs pursuant to MEAs with WTO rules, since this
would  lead  to  a  clear  understanding  of  what  kind  of  trade  measures  for  environmental
purposes are consistent under the WTO.  It is important for India to work towards such a
multilateral  interpretative  decision  and  understanding  within  the  WTO.    A  conceptual
understanding  is  particularly  significant  in  the  face  of  unilateral  trade  restrictions  on
environmental being sanctified in the post-WTO era.
It  is  in  the  best  interest  of  India  to  re-affirm  her  commitment  to  promoting
sustainable development along with trade liberalization, as set out in the Preamble to the
WTO Agreement and the Decision on Trade and Environment), and continue to support
environmental  initiatives  through  MEAs.    After  all,  the  WTO  is  not  an  environmental
policy making body, and should continue to promote trade liberalization with due respect to
multilateral  environmental  consensus  coming  from  organizations  specializing  in  those
issues.86
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